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Exploiting Regulatory Inconsistencies
Emily Cauble
Abstract
In many instances, sophisticated parties exploit inconsistencies
between regulatory regimes to achieve beneficial treatment under
each regime by obtaining classification under one regime that is, at
least superficially, inconsistent with classification under the other
regime. For instance, parties might design an instrument that is
treated as “debt” for tax purposes, but “equity” for purposes of
capital requirements instituted by financial regulators.
This Article asks whether exploiting regulatory inconsistencies
is problematic. This Article concludes that inconsistency, in and of
itself, is not necessarily a problem. Different regulatory regimes
might classify a transaction differently when doing so best serves
the unique goals of each regime. However, in other cases,
inconsistency could be a byproduct of inaccurate classification by at
least one regulatory regime. In such cases, the relevant regulator
needs to reconsider its classification scheme.
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I. Introduction
In
many
instances,
sophisticated
parties
exploit
inconsistencies between regulatory regimes to achieve beneficial
treatment under each regime by obtaining classification under one
regime that is, at least superficially, inconsistent with
classification under the other regime.1 For instance, parties might
1. See infra Part II.A (presenting examples of transactions that are treated
inconsistently by different regulatory regimes). Exploiting regulatory
inconsistencies represents a subset of what Professor Fleischer labeled
“regulatory arbitrage.” Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV.
227, 244 (2010). Professor Fleischer defined regulatory arbitrage to include not
only transactions in which parties exploit regulatory inconsistencies (which he
labeled “regulatory regime inconsistency”), but also transactions in which parties
exploit “economic substance inconsistency” (which occurs when “two transactions
with identical cash flows receive different regulatory treatment under the same
regulatory regime”) and transactions in which parties exploit “time inconsistency”
(which occurs when “the same transaction receives different regulatory treatment
in the future than it does today”). Id. In this Article, I examine only the first
category of transactions because they may raise unique concerns. In particular, it
is the only type of regulatory arbitrage in which sophisticated parties can obtain
the best of both worlds—obtaining tax benefits and benefits under a non-tax
regulatory regime by claiming inconsistent treatment across the two regimes.
Because the ability of sophisticated parties to have their tax cake and their
non-tax icing might strike some as particularly distasteful, it is worthwhile to
analyze whether this particular inconsistency is problematic and consider what
steps could be taken to address it when it is problematic.
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design an instrument that is treated as “debt” for tax purposes, but
“equity” for purposes of state usury law (or, perhaps, “equity” for
purposes of capital requirements instituted by financial
regulators).2 Parties might engage in a transaction that allows
recognition of losses for tax purposes, but does not require
recognition of losses for bank regulatory purposes.3
Intuitively, this type of behavior strikes many as
disconcerting. Sophisticated parties are able to achieve the best of
both worlds and avoid adverse treatment under multiple
regulatory regimes by classifying a transaction differently for
purposes of each regime.4 The inconsistencies inherent in these
transactions are the features that may seem particularly vexing.5
We might assume that a sophisticated party would design a
financial instrument to more closely resemble either debt or
equity, according to which would lead to the most favorable overall
outcome, taking into account all applicable regulatory regimes,
business considerations, and other factors. However, if the
instrument were designed so that it were “debt” for purposes of tax
law, but “equity” for purposes of capital requirements imposed by
bank regulators, we might be troubled by the sophisticated party’s
ability to have their tax cake and their bank regulatory icing too,
having achieved this outcome by taking positions that are, at least
superficially, inconsistent.
Although planning by sophisticated parties may be troubling
for a number of reasons,6 as this Article will argue, the
inconsistency inherent in these transactions, in and of itself, is not
2. See infra Part II.A (discussing how a taxpayer might issue an instrument
treated as debt for tax purposes and as equity for capital requirements purposes
or state usury law purposes).
3. See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text (recounting how during the
1980s savings and loan crisis, thrift institutions, holding suddenly devalued
mortgages, swapped substantially similar bundles of interests in mortgages to
report losses for tax purposes without needing to report the losses for regulatory
purposes); see also Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 556–57 (1991)
(holding that a financial institution realizes tax-deductible losses when it swaps
interests in a group of residential mortgage loans with other lenders).
4. See infra Parts II.A–B (providing examples of inconsistent treatment
between regulatory schemes and explaining how such inconsistencies occur).
5. See infra Part II.B (pointing out multiple causes of such inconsistencies).
6. See infra Part III (explaining that tax planning may be problematic for
a number of reasons).
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necessarily problematic.7 Because different regulatory regimes
might serve different purposes, classifying a transaction
differently under each regime might not be a true inconsistency.8
In other words, something could be “debt” for tax purposes, but
“equity” for state usury law purposes if the state usury laws have
good reason to mean something different by “debt” than what is
meant in the tax context.9 However, in some cases, inconsistency
could be a byproduct of underlying failings in one or more of the
regulatory regimes.10 For instance, the inconsistency in the
preceding example would be problematic if state usury laws do not,
in fact, have good reason to mean something different by “debt”
than what is meant in the tax context.
In other words, inconsistent labels alone do not necessarily
indicate that anything is amiss. Rather, each regulator must take
care to ensure that a given transaction’s classification is correct
under the regime that it administers, a fact which would be true
even if the transaction were not treated inconsistently by another
regime.
Exploitation of regulatory inconsistencies could also be
problematic because it reduces “frictions” against tax planning.
“Frictions” against tax planning are non-tax costs that a taxpayer
must bear in order to obtain a more favorable tax outcome.11
Because of frictions, taxpayers will sometimes abandon attempts
to structure their transactions to avoid adverse tax treatment if
such structuring would result in undesirable accounting
treatment, adverse non-tax regulatory treatment, or a sub-optimal
7. See infra Part III (explaining how inconsistency may not be problematic
when the different regimes serve different purposes).
8. See infra Part III (defining a “true inconsistency” as one between how
the transaction is treated under one regime and how it should be treated); Jordan
Barry, On Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 69, 75 (2010) (“The
difference in treatment between regimes is an indicator that one of the regulatory
regimes may be treating them inappropriately, but the difference in treatment is
not a problem in and of itself.”).
9. See infra Part III (explaining that differing classifications between two
regimes may be based on differing policy goals); Fleischer, supra note 1, at 244
(providing examples of diverging policy goals and how those impact the meaning
given to the same terms by two different regulatory regimes).
10. See infra Part IV (explaining how incorrect classification under one or
more regimes could lead to problematic inconsistencies in treatment).
11. See infra Part V.A (providing an overview of existing literature regarding
“frictions” against tax planning).
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business outcome.12 The ability of sophisticated parties to obtain
favorably different treatment under multiple regulatory regimes
can nullify the effects of otherwise potent frictions against tax
planning.13 However, as this Article will argue, reliance on another
regulatory regime as the source of friction could lead to arbitrary
outcomes if the other regulatory regime classifies transactions in a
manner unrelated to the goals of tax law.14 Such outcomes are not
ideal.
An existing body of literature discusses both frictions against
tax planning and the neutralization of those frictions by taxpayers’
ability to obtain inconsistent treatment across regulatory
regimes.15 To the existing literature, this Article adds several key
insights. First, this Article demonstrates that because of the
structure of several tax doctrines, potential non-tax regulatory
frictions against tax planning are not merely neutralized in some
instances.16 Rather, obtaining a beneficial non-tax regulatory
outcome can actually increase the chances of obtaining a beneficial
tax outcome.17 Second, this Article argues that the usefulness of a
non-tax regulatory regime as a friction will depend on whether the
goals of the non-tax regulatory regime are aligned with the goals
of tax law.18 Third, this Article provides examples to demonstrate
the process that regulators might follow when determining
whether inconsistent treatment is or is not appropriate in various
cases.19
12. See infra Part V.A (discussing the ability of frictions to inhibit tax
planning).
13. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the “malleability” of
a friction and its implications for taxpayer behavior).
14. See infra Part V.B (describing arbitrary outcomes that may arise).
15. See infra Part V.A (providing an overview of the existing literature on
frictions).
16. See infra Part II.C (describing how, in some instances, obtaining a
favorable outcome under a non-tax regime can increase the chances of obtaining
a favorable tax outcome).
17. See infra Part II.C (describing how, in some instances, obtaining a
favorable outcome under a non-tax regime can increase the chances of obtaining
a favorable tax outcome).
18. See infra Part V.B (discussing the arbitrary outcomes that could arise if
a non-tax regulatory regime with goals that diverged from the goals of tax law
were used as a friction against tax planning).
19. See infra Part IV (describing instances in which inconsistent treatment
is or is not appropriate).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides examples of
sophisticated parties obtaining beneficial, and seemingly
inconsistent, treatment across regulatory regimes. It also
illustrates how, in some cases, achieving a favorable non-tax
regulatory result can heighten the odds of attaining a positive tax
outcome. Part III presents the argument that inconsistency, in and
of itself, may not be problematic because different regulatory
regimes can serve different goals. Part IV illustrates how, in some
cases, inconsistency could be a byproduct of a failing in one or more
of the regulatory regimes. Finally, Part V addresses the effect of
inconsistent treatment on frictions against tax planning.
II. Taxpayers Who Get the Best of Both Worlds
By treating a transaction differently for purposes of different
regulatory regimes, a regulated party can potentially reap benefits
under each regime. First, this Part will present examples of
inconsistent treatment.20 Second, it will explain how inconsistency
arises.21 Finally, as the existing literature on frictions recognizes,
in many cases, parties utilize tax planning to obtain favorable tax
outcomes despite seemingly inconsistent and favorable non-tax
regulatory results.22 Subpart II.C will describe how, in some cases,
parties obtain beneficial tax outcomes through planning because of
the fact that they attained favorable non-tax regulatory results.
A. Examples of Inconsistent Treatment
A bank might issue a preferred stock instrument with enough
debt-like features that it could be treated as “debt” for tax
purposes, but “equity” for purposes of capital requirements
instituted by financial regulators. This treatment, which would be
inconsistent at least on its face, would provide the owners of the

20. See infra Part II.A (providing examples of inconsistent treatment in the
context of classifying an instrument as debt or equity).
21. See infra Part II.B (describing various causes of inconsistency).
22. See infra Part V.A (discussing how the ability to obtain favorable
outcomes under multiple regimes can nullify the effects of otherwise potent
frictions against tax planning).
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bank’s common stock with the best of both worlds.23 From a tax
perspective, “debt” treatment is preferable to “equity” treatment,24
and, from a capital requirements perspective, “equity”
classification is superior to “debt” classification.25
In terms of the tax outcome, if the instrument were considered
debt for tax purposes, the bank would be entitled to deduct interest
expense, but if the instrument were considered equity for tax
purposes, the bank would not be entitled to any deduction for
payments made on the instrument.26 Therefore, debt treatment
would be desirable because the interest deduction would reduce
the bank’s tax burden. On the other hand, for purposes of bank
capital requirements, equity classification is more advantageous
than debt classification. A bank is required to maintain a
minimum ratio of “tier one capital” to assets.27 If the instrument
were classified as equity for purposes of this requirement, the
instrument might constitute “tier one capital,” and the bank could
issue this instrument in lieu of issuing additional common stock.28
23. See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text (describing the advantages
of classifying an instrument in this manner).
24. In most cases, debt treatment is more advantageous than equity
treatment from a tax perspective. In some cases, however, a taxpayer could prefer
equity treatment. For instance, assume a tax-exempt entity owned an instrument
issued by an entity that was treated as a partnership for tax purposes. Assume
the partnership engaged in activity that generated unrelated business taxable
income. If the partnership is profitable, the tax-exempt entity may prefer that the
instrument is classified as debt for tax purposes so that it earns interest income
that is generally not subject to tax under the unrelated business income tax. If
the partnership generates losses, then the tax-exempt entity may prefer for the
instrument to be treated as equity for tax purposes so that it is allocated losses
that it could deduct against other unrelated business taxable income. See I.R.C.
§ 512(c) (2012) (describing the tax treatment of a tax-exempt organization that is
a partner in a partnership).
25. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (describing the advantages
of this classification).
26. See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 4.01[2] (6th ed. 2000) (“Section 163(a) allows
the payor corporation to deduct ‘all interest paid or accrued within the taxable
year on indebtedness,’ but no comparable deduction is allowed for distributions to
the corporation’s shareholders.” (quoting I.R.C. § 163(a) (2000))).
27. See Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical
Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 650–51 (2012) (discussing requirements for banks,
including the maintenance of minimum leverage ratios, calculated by “dividing
tier 1 capital . . . by the bank’s total assets”).
28. See id. at 651 (defining tier one capital as “essentially common stock,
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If the return on the preferred stock issued by the bank were limited
and if the bank were sufficiently profitable, then the owners of the
common stock would be better off than they would have been had
the bank been required to issue additional common stock that
would have diluted their return.29
Likewise, a corporation might issue an instrument treated as
“debt” for tax purposes, but “equity” for purposes of state usury
laws.30 From a tax standpoint, debt characterization is more
favorable because it allows the corporation to benefit from an
interest deduction.31 If the yield on the instrument would violate
state usury laws, then equity characterization for usury law
purposes would be more favorable because the instrument would
not be subject to state usury laws.32
B. How Inconsistency Arises
Sometimes, inconsistency across regulatory regimes might
arise because one regime is more substance-based while the other
is more form-driven.33 For instance, in some cases, state usury laws
might adopt a form-driven approach, classifying instruments as
debt or equity based on the labels assigned by the parties.34 At the
same time, tax law employs a substance-based approach to
classification that involves examining the economic features of an
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interests in the equity
accounts of consolidated subsidiaries”).
29. See id. at 649 (explaining how banks can increase their stockholders
return on equity by increasing their leverage).
30. See Jones Syndicate v. Comm’r, 23 F.2d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1927)
(concluding that “a taxpayer who borrows money at a usurious rate of interest
and who, to conceal the usury, is compelled to execute a document which does not
correctly describe the relationship of the parties, may, as against the government,
disclose the true relationship of debtor and creditor”).
31. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting I.R.C. § 163(a) allows
a tax deduction for interest).
32. See Jones Syndicate, 23 F.2d at 835 (discussing the interaction of equity
characterization and state usury laws).
33. See Barry, supra note 8, at 73 (“[R]egulatory arbitrage is a phenomenon
that follows from having regulations that fail to take economic reality into
account.”).
34. See infra note 109 and accompanying text (positing that this form-driven
approach was at work in both Jones Syndicate and Commissioner v. Bollinger).
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instrument and other factors.35 Therefore, tax-usury law
inconsistency could arise if an instrument were labeled “equity,”
but had debt-like economic features.
In other cases, inconsistency could arise even when both
regimes are substance-based.36 This could occur because the
regimes prioritize different factors or because factors that were
relevant for purposes of one could be irrelevant for purposes of the
other. For instance, as discussed below, a substance-based
classification scheme for state usury law purposes might focus
mainly on the extent to which the holder of the instrument has a
claim that was subordinate to the claims held by others.37 The
substance-based classification scheme used for tax purposes takes
into account subordination, but also examines many other
factors.38
Sometimes, inconsistent treatment is actively encouraged by
one of the regulators.39 For example, during the 1980s savings and
loan crisis, a number of thrift institutions held mortgages that had

35. See infra Part IV.A (cataloguing the substantive factors that may be
considered).
36. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting that even when both regimes are
substance-based, the relevant substance might not be the same under both
regimes).
37. See infra Part IV.B (asserting that for purposes of a state usury law
regime that examined substance, a claim subordinated to all other claims would
be considered equity).
38. See infra Parts IV.A–B (listing additional factors relevant to the tax
classification of an instrument as debt or equity).
39. Sometimes, inconsistent treatment also arises as a result of lobbying of
the regulators by the regulated parties. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as a
Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1338 n.85 (2001)
[B]anks petitioned the Federal Reserve to designate so called
trust-preferred securities as “tier one” capital. These securities were
eligible for a tax deduction, but their debt-like features rendered them,
at least initially, an insufficiently reliable source of core capital for
regulated banks. Eventually, though, the Federal Reserve relaxed its
standards enough to offer these securities a “tier one” designation.
The classification of trust preferred securities as “tier one” capital, however, has
been phased out by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act. See, e.g., Candemir Baltali & Joseph Tanega, Basel III: Dehybridization of
Capital, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 43 (2011) (“Given Dodd-Frank Act’s § 171,
neither trust preferred securities nor cumulative perpetual preferred stock would
qualify for inclusion as tier 1 capital among the top 50 [bank holding
companies].”).
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fallen drastically in value.40 The thrift institutions had issued the
loans at low, fixed interest rates, and market interest rates had
risen substantially.41 As a result, the loans had declined in value
significantly.42 The thrift institutions would benefit from realizing
the resulting losses for tax purposes, because doing so would allow
the institutions to deduct the losses, lowering their taxable income
and tax liability.43 However, reporting the losses for accounting
purposes (rather than continuing to report the loans as worth their
original value) could result in many of the thrift institutions being
subject to closure by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.44 In
order to enable the institutions to realize the losses for tax
purposes, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board issued a
memorandum describing a way in which thrift institutions could
swap substantially similar bundles of interests in mortgages
without being required to report the losses for regulatory
purposes.45 Thrift institutions engaged in the swaps and reported
the losses for tax purposes.46 The IRS challenged the losses claimed
by one of the institutions, and the Supreme Court held that the
losses were realized for tax purposes.47
Sometimes, inconsistent treatment might arise not because
the regulatory regimes lead to different outcomes, but because one
or more of the regimes is under-enforced. That is, parties
sometimes might claim inconsistent treatment in cases in which
their claim could be successfully challenged under one or more of
the regimes, if the regulator or regulators enforced the relevant
requirements.

40. See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 556 (1991) (“Cottage
Savings held numerous long-term, low-interest mortgages that declined in value
when interest rates surged in the late 1970’s.”).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 557.
45. See id. at 557 (“The FHLBB’s acknowledged purpose for Memorandum
R-49 was to facilitate transactions that would generate tax losses but that would
not substantially affect the economic position of the transacting S & L’s.”).
46. Id. at 557–58.
47. Id. at 558.
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C. Rather than Limiting Tax Planning, Efforts to Obtain
Favorable Non-Tax Regulatory Outcomes
Sometimes Facilitate Tax Planning
As discussed below, others have noted that, in some cases,
taxpayers’ aims to achieve favorable results under non-tax
regulatory regimes can serve as “frictions” against tax planning.48
“Frictions” against tax planning are non-tax costs that a taxpayer
must bear in order to obtain a more favorable tax outcome.49
Because of such frictions, taxpayers will sometimes abandon
attempts to structure their transactions to avoid adverse tax
treatment if such structuring would result in undesirable
accounting treatment, adverse non-tax regulatory treatment, or a
sub-optimal business outcome.50
The ability of sophisticated parties to simultaneously obtain
favorable treatment under multiple regulatory regimes can nullify
the effects of otherwise potent frictions against tax planning.51 In
fact, the state of affairs is even more favorable to taxpayers in some
cases. In particular, because of the structure of various tax rules,
in some cases the potential “friction” role of a non-tax regulatory
regime is not merely nullified—rather obtaining a favorable result
under a non-tax regime can grease the wheels of tax planning.
That is, obtaining a favorable non-tax outcome actually increases
the chances of obtaining a favorable tax outcome.

48. Infra Part V.A.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 1, at 244–47 (describing “regulatory
regime inconsistency”); Schizer, supra note 39, at 1324
[T]he “malleability” of a friction—is often crucial. For example,
corporate taxpayers often care about the earnings reported to
shareholders, so financial accounting is a “strong” friction. To maintain
impressive reported earnings, corporate managers may well abandon
a transaction that offers a tax benefit but also would depress earnings.
Issuance of a simple debt security, for instance, creates interest
expense that is tax deductible but also would reduce earnings. But
what if the best of both worlds is available? Can the deal be tweaked
so the expense no longer depresses accounting earnings, but still
generates a tax deduction? If so, the accounting friction is malleable
and will not stop the tax planning.
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To illustrate this, consider the Non-Disavowal Doctrine.52 In
tax cases, the genuine substance of a transaction will often
triumph over the transaction’s mere form for purposes of
determining the transaction’s tax consequences.53 Despite this
principle, a taxpayer often will be bound to the transactional form
that he or she selects.54 Courts’ rejection of taxpayers’ attempts to
52. See Robert Thornton Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer’s Right to
Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAX LAW. 137, 138 (1990) (defining the
Non-Disavowal Principle as “the classic statement that a taxpayer may not assert
the substance over form principle”); see also Kenneth L. Harris, Should There Be
a “Form Consistency” Requirement? Danielson Revisited, 78 TAXES 88, 89 (2000)
(referring to the “fundamental notion” that where the taxpayer controls the facts,
the taxpayer is restricted in its “ability to assert the substance and not the form
controls for tax purposes” as the “Taxpayer Non-Disavowal Principle”). Another
example would be the way in which attaining a favorable non-tax regulatory
outcome can serve the role of demonstrating “business purpose” under the
economic substance doctrine. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic
Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389, 433 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, Economic
Substance] (“[N]on-tax regulatory requirements seem to provide a business
purpose, even if the regulator condones a way to evade those requirements.”).
53. See, e.g., Michael E. Baillif, The Return Consistency Rule: A Proposal for
Resolving the Substance-Form Debate, 48 TAX LAW. 289, 289 (1995) (“A
fundamental principle of income tax law is that taxation should be based upon
the substance, not the form, of a transaction.”); J. Bruce Donaldson, When
Substance Over Form Argument Is Available to the Taxpayer, 48 MARQ. L. REV.
41, 41 (1964) (“The gospel that the substance of a transaction, rather than mere
form, controls the tax incidents is accepted by all.”); Harris, supra note 52, at 89
(“It is a fundamental principle of federal income taxation that the tax
consequences of a transaction turn on the ‘substance’ and not the ‘form’ of the
transaction.”); Smith, supra note 52, at 137 (“A fundamental principle of . . . tax
law is that taxation should be based upon the substance, and not the form, of
transactions.”). A complete discussion of substance-over-form in tax law is beyond
the scope of this Article. For some further discussion on this topic, see Joseph
Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859,
863–80 (1982); Jeffrey L. Kwall & Kristina Maynard, Dethroning King
Enterprises, 58 TAX LAW. 1, 11–15 (2004); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance
and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 386–87, 435–39 (1988); Lewis R.
Steinberg, Form, Substance, and Directionality in Subchapter C, 52 TAX LAW. 457,
457–88 (1999).
54. See, e.g., Baillif, supra note 53, at 289 (“Although the Service is routinely
granted the right to look beyond the form of a transaction or its label on a tax
return, a taxpayer’s right to assert the same privilege is, at best, uncertain.”);
William S. Blatt, Lost on a One-Way Street: The Taxpayer’s Ability to Disavow
Form, 70 OR. L. REV. 381, 384 (1991) (“The principle that the government alone
may appeal to the substance of a transaction pervades federal tax law. Every
taxpayer seeking to disavow the form of a transaction must consider the
possibility that substance arguments create a one-way street in favor of the
government.”); Donaldson, supra note 53, at 42
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invoke the substance-over-form doctrine has been referred to as
the
“Non-Disavowal
Doctrine.”55
Notwithstanding
the
Non-Disavowal Doctrine, taxpayers do not always lose when they
assert the rule of substance-over-form.56 Oftentimes, prevailing
taxpayers in such cases are able to provide a non-tax explanation
for the form they selected.57 Thus, for these taxpayers, a favorable
non-tax outcome increases the chances of a good tax outcome.58

A considerable body of thought exists that the doctrine of substance is
a sword available to the Commissioner, but that it may not be used as
a shield by the taxpayer. . . . While this homely bit of wisdom has much
present currency, it is not wholly accurate as a matter of over-all case
analysis.
Harris, supra note 52, at 89 (“[T]here is also a fundamental notion that where
the taxpayer, and not the government controls the facts, the taxpayer should be
restricted in its ability to assert that the substance and not the form controls for
tax purposes . . . .”); Nickolas J. Kyser, Substance, Form, and Strong Proof, 11
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 125, 125–26 (1994)
The notion that tax consequences should flow from the substance
rather than the form of transactions has been accepted by most
courts . . . . As one might expect, the courts have been rather skeptical
about the use of this idea by taxpayers, who were in position to control
the original form of the transaction and whose protestations that
something else was intended are likely to be affected by the
selectiveness of self-interested memory.
Smith, supra note 52, at 137
The Commissioner clearly is entitled to invoke [the notion that
substance prevails over form], but a taxpayer’s right to do so is
problematic. At times, the courts have accepted a taxpayer’s assertion
of the priority of substance. At other times, however, they have
concluded that a taxpayer is bound by the form of his transaction.
55. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 52, at 89 (referring to this concept as the
“Taxpayer Non-Disavowal Principle”); Smith, supra note 52, at 138 (referring to
this concept as the “Non-Disavowal Principle”).
56. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; see also Emily Cauble,
Reforming the Non-Disavowal Doctrine, 35 VA. TAX REV. 439, 441–42 (2016)
(explaining that taxpayers have more success when providing a “non-tax
explanation” for the selected form).
57. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; see also Cauble, supra note
56, at 441–42 (explaining that taxpayers have more success when providing a
“non-tax explanation” for the selected form); Comm’r v. Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d 792,
794 (9th Cir. 1936) (providing non-tax reason for selected form and succeeding on
claim).
58. See Comm’r v. Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1936) (providing
non-tax reason for selected form and succeeding on claim).
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In order to illustrate the Non-Disavowal Doctrine, consider the
facts and holding of Maletis v. United States.59 In Maletis, the
taxpayer established an entity to operate a wine-making
business.60 In form, the entity was owned by the taxpayer and his
two sons because paperwork had been filed with the IRS and state
authorities indicating that the entity was owned by the three
individuals and that all three had made contributions to the
entity.61 In substance, the entity was owned only by the taxpayer.62
His sons had not, in fact, made the claimed contributions to the
entity and, apparently, had no real involvement in the business.63
In years when the business was profitable, the taxpayer filed
tax returns in accordance with the form of the arrangement (in
other words, the tax returns were consistent with the entity being
a partnership owned by three individuals).64 As a result, in years
in which the business generated taxable income, that income was
reported in part by the taxpayer and in part by his sons.65 This
reporting led to less total tax liability than if all taxable income
had been reported by the taxpayer presumably because the sons
were subject to lower effective tax rates than the taxpayer.66
In a subsequent year in which the business generated a loss,
the taxpayer claimed that in substance the business was owned
entirely by him and not by a partnership in which his sons were
partners.67 As a result, the taxpayer asserted the right to deduct
the entire tax loss, leading to lower overall tax liability than what
would have resulted had the tax loss been shared among the
taxpayer and his sons, given his sons’ lower effective tax rates.68
The IRS challenged this treatment asserting that the taxpayer
should be bound by the form he previously selected: that of a

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952).
Id. at 97–98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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partnership.69 The court held in favor of the IRS.70 Thus, the
taxpayer was prevented from disavowing the form he selected and
was required to report tax consequences based on form rather than
substance.71
Describing the rationale for the Non-Disavowal Doctrine, the
court stated that without such a rule, “the taxpayer could
commence doing business as a corporation or partnership, and, if
everything [went] well, realize the income tax advantages
therefrom; but if things [did] not turn out so well, [could] turn
around and disclaim the business form he created to realize the
loss as his individual loss.”72 In other words, one goal of the
Non-Disavowal Doctrine is to prevent “post-transactional tax
planning.”73
A taxpayer who engages in “post-transactional tax planning”
structures a transaction so that he or she may report based either
on form or on substance, whichever would lead to more favorable
tax consequences, once the results of the transaction are known.74
In Maletis, for instance, if the business generated gains, the
taxpayer would report the results based on form because doing so
resulted in lower aggregate tax liability, but if the business

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. For further discussion, see Bailiff, supra note 53, at 298 (“[S]ome courts
fear that permitting a taxpayer to disavow her own form might invite that
taxpayer to engage in post-transactional tax planning. They worry that a
taxpayer may decide alternatively to support or impeach a form based upon her
post-transactional determination of the resultant tax liability . . . .”); Cauble,
supra note 56, at 460–71 (“[T]he Non Disavowal Doctrine appears to be intended
to address the possibility that taxpayers could intentionally engage in
transactions whose form differed from their substance to leave themselves the
option of engaging in Post-Transactional Tax Planning once the results of the
transaction were known.”); Harris, supra note 52, at 97 (“[C]oncerns about post
transactional tax planning . . . arise in situations where the taxpayer challenging
the form . . . proceeds to assert substance-over-form only after tax audit.”); Smith,
supra note 52, at 144 (“Some cases reflect the concern that permitting a taxpayer
to disavow its own form might entitle a taxpayer to engage in post-transactional
tax planning and, depending upon his tax circumstance, support or impeach
form.”).
74. See Cauble, supra note 56, at 442–43 (discussing post-transactional tax
planning).
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generated losses, the taxpayer would report the results based on
substance in order to obtain lower aggregate tax liability.75
In some cases, taxpayers successfully report based on
substance rather than form, notwithstanding the Non-Disavowal
Doctrine.76 Oftentimes, in a case in which the taxpayer prevails,
the taxpayer can provide a non-tax explanation for why the
taxpayer adopted a form that was different from the transaction’s
substance.77 In one example, the taxpayer labeled an instrument
“equity,” even though its substantive features were debt-like, in
order to avoid violating state usury laws.78 In another, the
taxpayer labeled an instrument “equity,” even though it had
debt-like substantive features, to avoid an adverse effect on the
credit rating of the corporation that issued the instrument.79 In
75. See Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 98–99 (9th Cir. 1952)
(discussing how the taxpayer obtained a tax benefit in the early years by treating
the entity as a partnership and, in the later years, the taxpayer sought to treat
the venture as if it were not a partnership).
76. See, e.g., Cauble, supra note 56, at 450–52 (discussing cases in which
taxpayers have successfully asserted substance-over-form, notwithstanding the
Non-Disavowal Doctrine).
77. In some cases, taxpayers’ attempts to assert that substance should
prevail over form succeed even though the taxpayer cannot provide a non-tax
explanation for the form selected. For an overview of the case law, see, for
example, Blatt, supra note 54, at 427–38.
78. See Jones Syndicate v. Comm’r, 23 F.2d 833, 834 (7th Cir. 1927) (“[T]he
witnesses who testified . . . described the transaction as a loan and stated that
the parties made use of the so-called first preferred stock as a mere expedient to
circumvent the force and effect of the usury laws.”).
79. See Comm’r v. Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d 792, 792 (9th Cir. 1936)
Aaron Holtz was willing to lend the necessary funds to the
contemplated organization, but was not willing to accept stock because
he desired to be assured that his advance would be repaid, and he also
wanted a definite income from the funds. It was deemed inadvisable to
issue bonds to cover the loans, as that would affect the credit of the
corporation.
For other cases in which taxpayers win and can provide a non-tax explanation for
the form that they selected, see, e.g., United States v. Title Guarantee & Tr. Co.,
133 F.2d 990, 992–96 (6th Cir. 1943) (holding that payments made on “preferred
stock” could be treated as deductible interest when the company issued “preferred
stock” with some debt-like features rather than an instrument labeled “debt” with
even more debt-like features in order to avoid an adverse effect on the company’s
creditworthiness); E.C. Gatlin v. Comm’r, 34 B.T.A. 50, 56 (1936) (“We therefore
conclude that a taxpayer who borrows money at a usurious rate of interest and
[who], to conceal the usury, is compelled to execute a document which does not
correctly describe the relationship of the parties, may, as against the government,
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both of these cases, the taxpayers prevailed in reporting the
consequences of the transaction as if the instrument were debt for
tax purposes.80
At first glance, it may seem odd that courts are more likely to
allow a taxpayer to obtain more beneficial tax consequences by
disavowing the form he or she selected if the form produced
non-tax benefits. However, this feature of law could be explained
as an attempt by courts to identify taxpayers who are not engaged
in “post-transactional tax planning” and allow those taxpayers to
disavow their selected forms.81 If a taxpayer engages in a
transaction and selects a form that differs from the transaction’s
substance, the taxpayer’s choice of form might generally suggest
that the taxpayer planned to leave open the option of engaging in
“post-transactional tax planning” by reporting the tax
consequences of the transaction based on either its form or its
substance, whichever, in hindsight, led to more favorable tax
consequences.82 If a given form was selected instead to produce
disclose the true relationship of debtor and creditor.”); Comm’r v. Bollinger, 485
U.S. 340, 342–50 (1988) (holding that a taxpayer could show that the true owner
of property, for tax purposes, was not a corporation when the reason the
corporation held legal title to the property was to avoid conflict with states usury
laws); Jones v. United States, 659 F.2d 618, 619–22 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
instruments could be treated as debt for tax purposes despite the fact that they
had some equity-like features when the reason for the equity-like features was to
comply with state statutory requirements governing insurance companies); Rev.
Rul. 78-397, 1978-2 C.B. 150 (concluding that a taxpayer could disregard a
circular flow of cash to treat the transaction based, instead, on its substance in a
circumstance in which the circular flow of cash was undertaken to meet minimum
state capitalization requirements).
80. See Jones Syndicate, 23 F.2d at 835 (“[A] taxpayer who borrows money
at a usurious rate of interest, and who, to conceal the usury, is compelled to
execute a document which does not correctly describe the relationship of the
parties, may, as against the government, disclose the true relationship of debtor
and creditor.”); Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d at 735 (upholding the lower court’s decision
to treat the instrument as debt for tax purposes).
81. This feature of current law might also be explained by some of the other
potential rationales for the Non-Disavowal Doctrine. For further discussion, see
Cauble, supra note 56, at 473 n.113 (discussing how this feature of law might also
be explained by other justifications for the Non-Disavowal Doctrine, including the
fact that the presence of a non-tax reason for adopting a given form can
undermine the extent to which the form of the transaction is reliable evidence of
a party’s intent).
82. See Cauble, supra note 56, at 443 (mentioning that, in the absence of
another explanation, the fact that a taxpayer designed a transaction so that its
form differed from its substance might suggest that a taxpayer planned to engage
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some non-tax benefits (for instance, if an instrument was labeled
“equity” to avoid state usury laws) that provides an alternative
explanation for the taxpayer’s chosen form, and the alternative
explanation might help to rebut the presumption that the taxpayer
selected a transactional form in order to facilitate
“post-transactional tax planning.”83
This line of reasoning is not entirely illogical. However, this
method of analysis will fail in many cases to accurately distinguish
between taxpayers who are engaging in “post-transactional tax
planning” and taxpayers who are not. As a result, some taxpayers
who are engaging in “post-transactional tax planning,” or who did
structure their transactions to facilitate “post-transactional tax
planning,” will, successfully disavow their selected forms.84 This is
true because a taxpayer could have multiple motives for selecting
a given form. For example, a taxpayer could label an instrument
that has debt-like features “equity” not only in order to avoid state
usury laws, but also to enable “post-transactional tax planning.”85
in post-transactional tax planning).
83. Id.
84. This approach can also result in holding some taxpayers to their selected
forms even when they did not engage in and had no intention to engage in
post-transactional tax planning. For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note
56, at 474–75
Some taxpayers may select a given form that differed from a
transaction’s substance merely because they did not give adequate
thought to the resulting tax consequences and did not seek tax advice
at the time they selected the form. For instance, a taxpayer might hold
an instrument that has debt-like features but label the instrument
“equity” in various documents merely because the taxpayer did not
evaluate the tax consequences of doing so. It is possible that this
taxpayer had no plans to engage in Post-Transactional Tax Planning
and would have reported the tax consequences as if the instrument was
debt (because it is debt in substance) regardless of the transaction's
economic outcome . . . . Nevertheless, if this taxpayer characterizes the
instrument as debt for tax reporting purposes in a year in which equity
treatment would lead to more tax liability, the Service can challenge
the taxpayer’s reporting based on the Non-Disavowal Doctrine.
Assuming the taxpayer has no non-tax explanation to offer for the
“equity” label that the taxpayer used, the taxpayer would likely lose.
85. For further discussion and a proposal for reform, see Cauble, supra note
56, at 475–81 (explaining how a taxpayer could be engaging in post-transactional
tax planning despite the fact that the taxpayer can offer a non-tax explanation
for his or her selected form and proposing a new method of analysis for courts to
use).
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As another illustration of how a non-tax explanation could
facilitate tax planning, imagine the facts of Maletis, but with a
couple modifications. Assume that the taxpayer adopted the
partnership form in order to obtain some non-tax benefit (perhaps
it allowed borrowing at a rate that would have violated state usury
laws if the loan were made to an individual rather than a
partnership). Also assume that the venture proved to be
unsuccessful for many years so that, in all years to date, the
taxpayer has reported the losses as his own (based on the
substance of the arrangement). Because this taxpayer can offer a
non-tax explanation for the form selected, the Non-Disavowal
Doctrine will not prevent this taxpayer from reporting the
consequences as if the arrangement were owned solely by the
taxpayer (disavowing the partnership form selected).86 This is true
notwithstanding the fact that this taxpayer may have intended to
engage in “post-transactional tax planning” (if the venture had
been successful and generated taxable income, the taxpayer may
have reported the results as if the venture were owned by a
partnership).87 For taxpayers such as this, non-tax regulatory
regimes do not act as a friction against tax planning.88 On the
contrary, the ability to offer a non-tax explanation for a taxpayer’s
selected form greases the tax planning wheels.

86. One might argue that, in such a case, there is no reason not to allow the
taxpayer to disavow the selected form. Unlike in the actual Maletis case, the
taxpayer never reported the results based on form. Therefore, the taxpayer is not
attempting to whipsaw the IRS by reporting based on substance after having
already reported based on form in years that are closed by the statute of
limitations. However, invoking the Non-Disavowal Doctrine might still be
warranted in this case if the taxpayer planned to report based on form in years
when the business was profitable, but the taxpayer simply has not had a chance
to do so because the venture has not generated taxable income. Invoking the
Non-Disavowal Doctrine in such a case could be described as a penalty intended
to discourage taxpayers from structuring transactions so that form differed from
substance to enable post-transactional tax planning.
87. If the taxpayer did report the results as if the venture was owned by a
partnership, the IRS could successfully challenge this claim based on the
substance-over-form doctrine. See supra note 53 and accompanying text
(discussing the substance-over-form doctrine). However, the IRS might not audit
this particular taxpayer, and in such a case, the taxpayer’s claim would proceed
unchallenged.
88. See infra Part V.A (discussing the existing literature regarding frictions
against tax planning).
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III. Inconsistency is not Necessarily Inconsistency

Tax planning—taxpayers re-arranging their transactions and
other behavior to obtain more favorable tax outcomes—potentially
leads to a number of adverse consequences, at least when it is not
the type of planning that tax provisions are explicitly designed to
encourage.89 In particular, when sophisticated parties structure
their transactions to obtain more beneficial tax outcomes, that
behavior erodes tax revenue.90 In addition, tax planning
perpetuates unfairness when sophisticated parties achieve more
favorable tax outcomes than less sophisticated taxpayers.91 It also
contributes to the perception that the tax system is unfair, which
can, in turn, undermine voluntary tax compliance.92 Finally, tax
89. If the planning is what Congress intended, then it is not abusive and
possibly is valuable, if the behavior encouraged by the particular tax provision is
valuable. See, e.g., Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 52, at 395–96
If measuring income without altering taxpayer behavior were the only
thing Congress sought to accomplish with the federal income tax
system, then, in theory, any tax-motivated action could be considered
inconsistent with the goal of the tax system . . . . However, it is well
known that the federal income tax system does not try only to measure
taxpayers’ taxable income. It also contains provisions expressly
designed to alter taxpayers’ behavior. These latter provisions
intentionally mismeasure income in order to induce more of a
particular activity. For example, the individual retirement account
provisions encourage people to save money for their retirement. More
generally, certain transactions may only be profitable after taxes and
may thus be undertaken because of the tax subsidy the government
offers. Taking the government up on proffered tax benefits is, by
definition, not abusive.
90. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1319 (“The reasons for curtailing tax
planning are familiar and can be stated briefly. Obviously, more revenue is
collected, so the government is funded without need for other taxes that are less
appealing.”).
91. See, e.g., id. (“The reasons for curtailing tax planning are familiar and
can be stated briefly . . . . Since wealthy and well advised taxpayers have an edge
in planning, limiting this advantage can lead to a more equitable distribution of
tax burdens.”).
92. See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Tax Planning, Effective Marginal Tax Rates,
and the Structure of the Income Tax, 54 TAX L. REV. 555, 555 (2001) (“The specter
of wealthy individuals and large corporations hiring legions of high-priced
lawyers and accountants to develop and implement tax saving strategies creates
the perception that the system is unfair.”); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay
Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1476–
78 (2003) (discussing the effects of perceptions of fairness on tax compliance);
Schizer, supra note 39, at 1319 (“Since wealthy and well advised taxpayers have
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planning potentially creates inefficiency and wastes societal
resources.93
These ramifications of tax planning exist even in cases that do
not involve exploiting regulatory inconsistencies. To address the
question of whether something should be done to prevent
exploiting regulatory inconsistencies, we should address the
question of whether inconsistency, in and of itself, is particularly
problematic.
If the two regulatory regimes serve different purposes, the
perceived inconsistency is not troubling because it is not true
inconsistency. The parties are not, for instance, representing
different facts to different regulators. The regulators view the
same facts through their respective lenses and reach different
conclusions because they are focused on classifications with
different criteria.94 For example, something could be “debt” for tax
an edge in planning, limiting this advantage can lead to a more equitable
distribution of tax burdens. The average taxpayer’s faith in the system is
preserved, promoting voluntary compliance and the attendant savings in
enforcement costs.”).
93. See Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of
Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 23 (2010)
(“Scholars generally conclude that the ability of taxpayers to select their tax
treatment by arranging their business affairs in particular ways is detrimental
to societal welfare . . . .”); Knoll, supra note 92, at 555 (“Tax planning not only
creates harmful perceptions, it also is frequently harmful in its own
right . . . . [T]ax planning leads taxpayers to invest in many projects that they
would not undertake solely on the economics.”); Schizer, supra note 39, at 1319
(stating that limiting tax planning reduces “social waste . . . as taxpayers refrain
from tax motivated behavior”); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and
Efficiency in Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1999) [hereinafter
Weisbach, Line Drawing] (“Taxing similar activities differently causes behavioral
distortions . . . .”). Additionally, scholars have observed that tax planning is
wasteful because the time and resources devoted to tax planning could be put to
better, more productive uses. See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 92, at 555–56 (“From a
societal standpoint, it would be better simply to reduce taxes and redeploy the
time and talent devoted to tax planning to other more productive pursuits.”);
David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002)
[hereinafter Weisbach, Ten Truths] (“Nothing is gained by finding new ways to
turn ordinary income into capital gain, to push a gain offshore, or to generate
losses. No new medicines are found, computer chips designed, or homeless housed
through tax planning.”).
94. For similar discussion, see Barry, supra note 8, at 75 (“The difference in
treatment between regimes is an indicator that one of the regulatory regimes may
be treating them inappropriately, but the difference in treatment is not a problem
in and of itself.”); Fleischer, supra note 1, at 244
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purposes, but “equity” for state usury law purposes if the state
usury laws have good reason to mean something different by “debt”
than what is meant in the tax context.95 If the regimes serve
different goals, then to avoid a true inconsistency (meaning
inconsistency between how the transaction is treated under one of
the regimes and how it should be treated under that regime), it
might be necessary to classify a transaction differently for
purposes of each regime.
One might respond that inconsistent treatment compounds
the problems associated with run-of-the-mill tax planning (in other
words, tax planning that does not involve inconsistent treatment)
by making tax planning easier. In particular, by claiming
inconsistent treatment, a sophisticated party can obtain a
favorable tax outcome without sacrificing his or her non-tax
regulatory goals. In other words, claiming inconsistent treatment
nullifies a potential friction, a concern that is addressed in Part V
below.
One might also respond that inconsistent treatment
compounds the typical tax planning problems by further
perpetuating unfairness because the inconsistent treatment
heightens the advantages gained by sophisticated parties. Not only
can sophisticated parties obtain better tax outcomes than others,
but they can also obtain more favorable non-tax regulatory
outcomes at the same time. However, if the non-tax regulatory
regime has goals that are entirely unrelated to the goals of tax law,
this concern may be misplaced. A party who obtains a favorable
tax outcome via planning may have benefited from a number of
fortunate circumstances in any number of areas of life, and
Doctrinal inconsistency is not always a mistake caused by inept
legislative drafting. Different regulators may have different policy
goals in mind. It may be important for securities regulators, who seek
to protect investors, to define the meaning of “security,” “dealer,” or
“sale” in a way that differs from the taxing authorities, who seek to
raise money for the public fisc.
Grace Soyon Lee, What’s In a Name?: The Role of Danielson in the Taxation of
Credit Card Securitizations, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 110, 162–65 (2010) (discussing
how, in the context of credit card securitization, tax treatment and accounting
treatment may differ because accounting rules have different goals than tax
rules).
95. See supra Part II.B (discussing potential causes of inconsistencies
between an instrument’s tax classification and its classification for purposes of
state usury laws).
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obtaining a favorable non-tax regulatory outcome is not, in
principle, any different from those other fortunate circumstances.
In other words, to argue that someone is less deserving of a
favorable tax outcome because he or she obtained a favorable state
usury law outcome would seem to be equivalent to arguing that a
person is less deserving of a favorable tax outcome because he or
she benefits from good health.
IV. Inconsistency as a Byproduct of Inaccuracy
Although inconsistent treatment across regulatory regimes, in
and of itself, might not be a problem, in some cases, the
inconsistency could result from incorrect classification under one
or more of the regimes. Because this Part makes use of examples
involving the classification of instruments as debt or equity, it will
begin by describing how tax law classifies instruments. Then, it
will discuss whether and when inconsistency between tax
classification and state usury law classification is acceptable.
Finally, it will evaluate the appropriateness of inconsistency
between tax characterization and categorization for purposes of
capital requirements.
A. Debt Versus Equity in Tax Law
Based on existing doctrine, an instrument will be treated as
debt for tax purposes only if the parties intend for the holder of the
instrument to have a definite right to be repaid a fixed amount at
a certain time, regardless of the income of the obligor.96 To
96. See, e.g., Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 1365, 1367–68 (9th Cir. 1984)
The determination of whether an advance is debt or equity depends on
the distinction between a creditor who seeks a definite obligation that
is payable in any event, and a shareholder who seeks to make an
investment and to share in the profits and risks of loss in the venture.
Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1967)
The term “indebtedness” implies an existing unconditional and legally
enforceable obligation to pay . . . . Generally, these criteria are
designed to disclose the real nature of the transaction in question-that
is whether it exhibits the characteristics of a bona-fide loan to the
corporation which is expected, indeed, may be compelled, to be repaid
in full at some future date, or whether as a formalized attempt to
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determine the parties’ intent, courts examine underlying
substantive factors rather than merely relying on the parties’ label
for the instrument.97 Assume, for instance, that the holder of a
given instrument has provided an advance to a corporation.
Substantive factors in the case of the advance to the corporation
could include, among others: (1) whether the corporation has made
an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount to the holder of
the instrument, (2) whether the holder of the instrument has a
legal right to enforce payment, (3) whether the instrument has a
long or short term to maturity, (4) whether the corporation is
thinly capitalized (in other words, whether it has a high ratio of
debt to equity), (5) the liquidity of the corporation’s assets, (6) the
stability of the corporation’s revenues, (7) subordination of the
instrument to other creditors, and (8) whether the instrument that
is claimed to be “debt” is held by the owners of the equity of the
corporation and, if so, whether the “debt” is held in the same
proportion as the proportion in which the owners hold the equity.98
These factors can be grouped into three general categories.
First, a court might use some of the factors to verify, as a threshold
matter, that the holder of the instrument has a legal right to
receive definite payment.99 Factors (1) and (2) assist a court in
making this determination, which is relevant to the ultimate
question the court must answer: whether the parties intend for the

achieve the desired tax result while lacking in necessary substance, it
merely parades under the false colors of such a transaction.
John Lizak, Inc. v. Comm’r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 804, 807 (1969) (“It has often been
recognized that ‘the essential difference between a creditor and a stockholder is
that the latter intends to make an investment and take the risks of the venture,
while the former seeks a definite obligation, payable in any event.”); see also
William T. Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A
Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 404–05 (1970–71) (quoting
and citing to cases that have described the distinction between debt and equity in
a similar manner).
97. See Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1367–68 (“The outward form of the transaction is
not controlling; rather, characterization depends on the taxpayer’s actual intent,
as evidenced by the circumstances and conditions of the advance.”).
98. See Plumb, supra note 96, at 411–12 (compiling and categorizing a list of
factors upon which courts have relied).
99. See Plumb, supra note 96, at 411–12 (conceptualizing this category as
factors “involving the formal rights and remedies of creditors as distinguished
from stockholders”).

EXPLOITING REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES

1919

holder of the instrument to have a definite right to be repaid a fixed
amount at a certain time, regardless of the income of the obligor.
Second, some of the factors are aimed at determining whether
or not the advance could be repaid.100 In other words, some are
utilized to assess the instrument’s risk.101 Factors (3) through (7)
provide information relevant to assessing risk, or the corporation’s
ability to make payments when due. Although courts do not always
view the world in this way,102 if the relevant factors suggest that
an instrument is very risky, such an assessment could undercut a
determination that the holder possessed a legal right to payment.
This would cause the instrument to be treated as equity for tax
purposes. However, a determination that an instrument is not very
risky should not negate the fact that the issuer has no legal
obligation to make a payment on the instrument under the
instrument’s formal legal terms. In other words, the riskiness of
an instrument could make promises to pay illusory with the result
that a court would not respect those promises in characterizing the
instrument. However, we can consider the reverse by imagining
that the parties have made abundantly clear that a low-risk issuer
will be excused from making payments in the event of financial
difficulty. The fact that the instrument is not risky (in the sense
that financial difficulty is unlikely) arguably should not convince a
court that the parties intend for the holder of the instrument to
have a definite right to be repaid a fixed amount at a certain time,
regardless of the income of the obligor.103 The parties have
explicitly provided otherwise.
100. See id. (conceptualizing this category as factors “bearing on the
reasonableness or economic reality of [the intention to create a debtor-creditor
relationship] (the risk element)”).
101. See id. (describing these factors as relevant to the “risk element”).
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing how some courts
follow this approach but some do not).
103. A number of courts follow an approach similar to what is described
above. See, e.g., Plumb, supra note 96, at 413
The presence of a maturity date does not guarantee recognition of
indebtedness, if other factors indicate an equity investment, since “it
is not unusual for preferred stock to have a maturity or retirement
date” and since there may be an unexpressed intention not to enforce
the obligation when it comes due. But the absence of such an
unconditional right to demand payment is most often conclusive.
However, some courts have departed from this approach. See, e.g., Plumb, supra
note 96, at 415 (“There are some cases, however, holding that contingency of
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Finally, courts employ some factors to judge whether the
advance would be repaid even if funds were available and even if
the holder has a technical right to enforce payment.104 In
particular, factor (8) above assists courts with this inquiry.105 To
take an extreme example of a situation in which factor (8) applies,
imagine that one individual owns 100% of the equity of a
corporation, and that individual also makes a loan to the
corporation. Even if the formal terms of the instrument provide the
holder with a right to enforce a definite payment obligation, courts
might be skeptical of the likelihood that the holder of the
instrument would enforce that right, given that the holder would
be enforcing the right against his or her wholly-owned
corporation.106 That said, courts will not, inevitably,
re-characterize the instrument as equity for tax purposes. The
instrument could be respected as debt, as long as, based on other
factors (such as the corporation not being too thinly capitalized),
the instrument was not excessively risky.107 In such a case, the
rationale for respecting it as debt may be that if an unrelated
person were to make an arms-length loan on the same terms and
if the loan from the unrelated person would have been respected
as debt for tax purposes, then there is no reason why the same
instrument should not also be considered debt when it is held by
the corporation’s sole owner.
ultimate payment upon availability of earnings is not conclusive against the
existence of a debt, at least if there is a reasonable expectancy that full payment
will occur.”). The IRS also has departed from this method of analysis in a chief
counsel advisory. Infra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.
104. See Plumb, supra note 96, at 411–12 (conceptualizing this category as
factors “bearing on the genuineness of the intention to create a debtor-creditor
relationship”).
105. Other factors that courts use to address this question could include:
(1) whether payments have been made on the instrument when due, (2) if
payments were not made when due, whether the holder brought legal action to
enforce payment, and (3) other, similar factors. Plumb, supra note 96, at 412.
106. See, e.g., Plumb, supra note 96, at 406 (“[T]he limitations on the rights of
purported creditors that must be carefully spelled out in the instruments when
outside investors are involved may exist as tacit understandings when the
common shareholders or closely related parties themselves supply the funds.”).
107. See, e.g., id. at 470 (“Once it is acknowledged, however, that a
shareholder may occupy a dual status as investor and creditor, proportionality
per so cannot be viewed as affirmative evidence for treatment of purported debt
as equity.”).
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B. Tax and State Usury Law
Consider the example of an instrument that is classified as
debt for tax purposes, but equity for state usury law purposes.
These different regulatory regimes could reach different results
because one is predominantly substance-based, while the other is
more form-driven. As discussed above, tax law classifies
instruments as debt or equity based on substantive factors.108 On
the other hand, state usury laws in a given jurisdiction might
adopt a more formal classification system, relying more heavily
upon the labels adopted by the parties.109 Assume a given state has
adopted a form-based system mainly for reasons of administrative
convenience (because form is more readily apparent), but for other
policy reasons, the state would prefer a more substance-based
definition. If this is the case, then treating the instrument
differently for purposes of usury law than how it is treated for tax
purposes may be undesirable. Because the difficult work of
classifying based on substance is already necessary for tax
purposes, such a state might decide to reform its usury law
definition to tie classification to the tax classification, if the state’s
only rationale for using a form-based system is administrative
ease.
Of course, in many cases, the “substance” that is relevant for
state usury law purposes would not be the same “substance” that
is relevant for tax purposes. State usury laws are generally aimed
at protecting the recipient of an advance of funds from
advantage-taking by the person who makes the advance.
Presumably, equity is exempted from state usury laws because a
high return on equity takes advantage of no one, so long as the
equity is subordinate to all other interests in the venture. In other
words, if a debt-holder is paid before an equity-holder, a high
108. See supra notes 98–106 and accompanying text (discussing factors
considered when determining whether an instrument is equity or debt for tax
purposes).
109. It seems that this was true in the case of the usury laws applicable in
Jones Syndicate. Supra note 78 and accompanying text. For a more modern
example, consider Bollinger. Supra note 79 and accompanying text. For purposes
of determining who the borrower was in Bollinger, the applicable state usury laws
examined who held formal legal title to the property that secured the loan rather
than relying upon more substantive indicia of ownership. Comm’r v. Bollinger,
485 U.S. 340, 347–49 (1988).
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interest rate on the debt detracts from the return earned by the
equity-holder. A high return on equity harms no one given that the
equity-holder’s claim is not preferred to the claims of others. Based
on this line of thinking, if usury laws were based on substance,
subordination of a claim would seem to be the pre-eminent factor
in any analysis of whether a claim was debt or equity. If a claim
was subordinated to all other claims, it would clearly be equity for
state usury law purposes. If a claim was not subordinated to all
other claims, it might not be equity for state usury law purposes.110
Layered on top of this, one could imagine state usury laws not
applying to a debt instrument if the borrower was deemed to be
sophisticated (using any number of plausible proxies for
sophistication), and therefore, less likely to fall victim to an
unscrupulous lender.111
In the tax context, subordination of a claim to other creditors
is one factor that increases the likelihood that the claim will be
classified as equity for tax purposes, given that subordination
increases the risk that the holder will not receive payment.112
Therefore, there is some overlap between the factors that are
relevant to the tax analysis and the factors that could be relevant
to a substance-based state usury law analysis.
However, some of the factors that weigh in favor of equity for
tax purposes have no bearing on the primary concern behind state
usury law—namely, the possibility that the holder of the
110. Perhaps, even if an instrument was not subordinated to all other claims,
state usury laws might classify it as equity if it was sufficiently risky to justify a
higher rate of return. That could be the case. However, many of the circumstances
in which a lender might charge a high rate of interest are circumstances in which
the rate might be risk-based (based on the borrower’s lack of credit history or bad
credit history, for instance), and yet, these are the typical circumstances in which
state usury laws would apply. In any case, the analysis above is designed as
merely an illustration of the process that regulators might follow when analyzing
whether inconsistent treatment is or is not appropriate. In particular, regulators
should consider the goals of each regime, and based on those goals, determine
which substantive factors are relevant to classify a given instrument or
transaction.
111. In Commissioner v. Bollinger, for instance, the state usury laws would
not apply to a loan made to a corporation, but would have applied to a loan made
to the corporation’s sole owner, perhaps based on the dubious (and form-driven)
assumption that corporations are sophisticated. 485 U.S. 340, 347–49 (1988).
112. See, e.g., Plumb, supra note 96, at 421–30 (discussing the use of
subordination to other creditors as a factor in the tax analysis).

EXPLOITING REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES

1923

instrument could take advantage of the owners of business by
requiring a high return. For instance, imagine a corporation
acquires assets worth $1,000. The corporation, in turn, has issued
three instruments to raise the capital used to acquire its assets:
(1) one instrument (Clear Debt) that is clearly debt for all purposes
(tax and usury law), (2) a second instrument (Ambiguous) whose
classification is ambiguous, and (3) a third instrument (Clear
Equity) that is clearly equity for all purposes (tax and usury law).
The holders of Ambiguous have claims to income of the corporation
and assets on liquidation that are subordinated to the claims of
Clear Debt, but prior to the claims of Clear Equity. Because the
claims of Ambiguous are prior to the claims of Clear Equity, the
possibility of advantage-taking cannot be entirely ruled out, so
debt would be an arguably appropriate classification for state
usury law purposes.
The instrument’s tax classification would depend on a number
of other factors in addition to subordination. For instance, with a
thinly capitalized corporation (meaning the ratio of its debt to its
equity is high), the riskiness of Ambiguous increases substantially,
and therefore, so too do the odds of Ambiguous being treated as
equity for tax purposes.113 Compare, for instance, Example 1 (Clear
Debt is $700, Ambiguous is $100, and Clear Equity is $200) to
Example 2 (Clear Debt is $200, Ambiguous is $100, and Clear
Equity is $700). Ambiguous is a much riskier instrument in
Example 1 than in Example 2. In Example 1, if the value of the
corporation’s assets were to decrease by more than $200 (which
represents 20% of the total asset value), Ambiguous would not be
repaid in full. In Example 2, however, the value of the corporation’s
assets could decrease by $700 (which represents 70% of the total
asset value) before Ambiguous received less than full repayment.
Because Ambiguous is much riskier in Example 1, it is much more
likely that Ambiguous would be classified as equity for tax
purposes in Example 1. At the same time, increasing the
proportion of assets funded by Clear Debt does not necessarily
lessen the concern that the holders of Ambiguous could take
advantage of the holders of Clear Equity by exacting a high rate of
return. As long as someone is in line behind Ambiguous, potential
113. See, e.g., id. at 507–19 (discussing the use of thin capitalization as a
factor in the tax analysis).
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for advantage-taking exists. Accordingly, thin capitalization does
not necessarily suggest that an instrument should be treated like
equity for state usury law purposes. The increased risk should,
arguably, increase the maximum allowable interest rate, but it
would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that usury laws ought
not apply at all.
As mentioned above, some of the factors used in the tax
analysis of debt versus equity do not relate the risk of the
instrument (whether the instrument can be repaid), but instead
inform the question of whether the advance will be repaid.114 For
instance, if an instrument that is purportedly “debt” is held by the
owners of the equity of a business and held in the same proportion
as the proportion in which they hold the equity, the chances that
the instrument will be reclassified as equity for tax purposes
increase.115 To illustrate, assume that, in Example 1 and Example
2 above, two entities each own 50% of the Clear Equity. The
likelihood of Ambiguous being classified as equity in either
example increases if those same two entities also own 50% of
Ambiguous. If they each own 50% of each instrument, then the
entities will be indifferent between the corporation making a given
payment to the holders of Ambiguous or to the holders of Clear
Equity, because, in either case, they each receive 50% of the
payment. Consequently, if the corporation were to encounter some
temporary financial trouble such that forgiving payments due on
Ambiguous might increase the corporation’s overall value, the
holders of Ambiguous would be very unlikely to enforce payment
obligations. Each holder is compensated for any amount that
either loses equally on Ambiguous by an equally increased return
on Clear Equity.
This same factor (the instrument being held in the same
proportion as equity) should also obviate the need to worry about
advantage-taking by the holders of Ambiguous. A high rate of
return on Ambiguous detracts only from the return on Clear
Equity. If both instruments were held by the same entities and
114. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (describing factors
relevant to the evaluation of whether an advance will be repaid).
115. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (discussing how the
chances that an instrument will be classified as equity for tax purposes increase
if the instrument is held by the equity-holders in the same proportion as the
proportion in which they hold the equity).
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were held in the same proportion, then any harm done to either
entity as a result of holding Clear Equity would inure to the benefit
of that same entity as a result of holding Ambiguous. Therefore,
proportionate ownership would also be a factor that would weigh
in favor of treating Ambiguous as equity for state usury law
purposes if state usury laws were to employ a substance-based
analysis.
Even though proportionate ownership is a factor that weighs
in favor of classifying an instrument as equity for tax purposes, it
does not, under current doctrine, end the tax analysis.116 Owners
of something that is clearly equity could still make loans to a
corporation that could be respected as debt for tax purposes, even
if the loans were made in proportion to their equity ownership.117
To take an extreme example, imagine that one entity owned 100%
of the stock of a corporation. That entity could make a loan to the
corporation that was respected as debt so long as the instrument
was not excessively risky (based on other factors, such as the
corporation not being too thinly capitalized).118 In such a case,
however, the reasoning described above would still suggest that
the instrument should be equity for purposes of state usury laws.
An entity would not take advantage of its wholly-owned
corporation by making a loan and charging an excessively high
rate.
Given that different “substance” matters to each regime,
inconsistent treatment, in some cases, is appropriate. For example,
assume an instrument is classified as equity for tax purposes, but
debt for state usury law purposes. This inconsistency may be
appropriate if the claims of some equity-holders are subordinated
to the claims of the instrument-holder (so that it is classified as
debt for state usury law purposes given the potential harm that
could befall the holders of the subordinated claims), but the obligor
on the instrument was thinly capitalized (so that it is classified as
equity for tax purposes given the riskiness of the instrument). As
another example, assume an instrument is classified as debt for
116. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (noting that it is
possible for an instrument to be classified as debt even when it is held by the
equity-holders in the same proportion as the proportion in which they hold
equity).
117. Supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
118. Supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
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tax purposes, but equity for state usury law purposes. This
inconsistency may be appropriate if the instrument is held in the
same proportion as any claims that are subordinated to it (so that
it is classified as equity for state usury law purposes given that
there is no potential for a high rate of return on the instrument to
harm the holders of subordinated claims) and, at the same time,
various facts support classifying the instrument as debt for tax
purposes (for instance, the terms of the instrument provide the
holder with a definite and legally enforceable right to payment on
a date that is not far in the future, and the entity is not thinly
capitalized).
In other cases, inconsistent treatment may be inappropriate.
For example, if an instrument was treated as debt for tax purposes
because its holders had claims to income of the entity and assets
upon liquidation that were prior to the claims held by all others
and the venture was not thinly capitalized, the instrument should
likely be classified as debt for state usury law purposes as well
(assuming no countervailing factor, such as the fact that the
instrument is held in the same proportion as the subordinated
claims). In such a case, inconsistent treatment would likely occur
only if the applicable state usury law regime employed a
classification scheme based on form rather than substance, which
might not be justified by considerations of administrative ease if
the work of substance-based determinations must already be
undertaken for tax purposes.
C. Tax and Capital Requirements
Just as a taxpayer might design an instrument that is debt for
tax purposes, but equity for purposes of state usury law, so too
might a bank issue an instrument that was debt for tax purposes,
but equity for purposes of capital requirements. Bank capital
requirements are generally aimed at reducing the risk that a bank
will become insolvent.119 In addition to other requirements, a bank

119. See, e.g., Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Regulation by Enforcement: An
Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 649 (2012) (“Other things being equal, banks
that hold more capital are less likely to become insolvent and inflict losses on
depositors.”).
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will be required to maintain a minimum “leverage ratio.”120 The
“leverage ratio” is the ratio of the bank’s “tier one capital” to total
assets.121 “Tier one capital” includes instruments issued by the
bank that are categorized, for bank regulatory purposes, as various
types of equity.122
A higher “leverage ratio” reduces the risk of insolvency.123 If a
bank’s assets fall in value, but still exceed the value of deposits and
other liabilities, the bank remains solvent.124 Thus, a higher
leverage ratio decreases the risk of insolvency because “tier one
capital” bears the first losses.125
For instance, assume a bank’s total assets were worth $100
million. Assume the bank acquired those assets using $70 million
held in deposit accounts at the bank and $30 million raised by
issuing equity (“tier one capital”). If the assets declined in value,
but not below $70 million, the bank would remain solvent and able
to honor the claims of deposit-holders.126 The first $30 million in
losses would be borne by the equity-holders. The risk that this
bank would become insolvent is lower than the risk of insolvency
for an otherwise identical bank with a lower ratio of equity to
assets.127 For instance, if the otherwise identical bank were to
acquire $100 million in assets using $90 million held in deposit
accounts and $10 million raised by issuing equity, its risk of
insolvency would be much greater.
A bank might issue a preferred stock instrument with enough
debt-like features so that it constitutes debt for tax purposes, but
120. See id. at 650–51 (discussing the leverage ratio requirement and other
requirements).
121. See id. at 651 (defining “leverage ratio”).
122. See id. (defining “tier one capital” as “essentially common stock,
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interests in the equity
accounts of consolidated subsidiaries”).
123. See id. (providing an example of how a higher “leverage ratio” lowers the
risk of insolvency).
124. See id. at 649 (stating that holding more capital reduces the chance of a
bank becoming insolvent).
125. See id. at 651 (describing banks with a higher “leverage ratios” as
generally subject to a lower risk of insolvency).
126. See id. at 649 (“[B]anks that hold more capital are less likely to become
insolvent and inflict losses on depositors.”).
127. See supra note 123–125 and accompanying text (discussing the
decreased risk that comes from a higher “leverage ratio”).
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equity for purposes of capital requirements. This combination
would provide the bank (or, more precisely, its common
stockholders) with the best of both worlds. Because the instrument
was classified as debt for tax purposes, the bank would be entitled
to an interest deduction that could increase the after-tax return
earned by the common stockholders.128 Because the instrument
was classified as equity for purposes of capital requirements, the
bank could issue the instrument in lieu of additional common
stock, which would have diluted the ownership interest held by the
common stockholders.129
As mentioned, the aim of bank capital requirements is to
reduce the risk of insolvency.130 Therefore, a substance-based
classification scheme would categorize an instrument as equity for
bank regulatory purposes only if the holder cannot legally enforce
payment on the instrument—or, more precisely, only if the holder’s
rights of enforcement are limited to the claim that the instrument
precedes the common stock. In other words, an instrument could
be equity if its holders have the right to require that they are paid
before the holders of the common stock, so long as they do not have
the right to enforce payment when no payments are made with
respect to the common stock. Furthermore, an instrument that had
a maturity date (or a date on which redemption was required)
would be problematic because the bank’s failure to make the
required payment could result in insolvency. Likely for these
reasons, perpetual preferred stock is classified as “tier one
capital.”131 Regulators might accept an instrument with a maturity
date, but only if payment would be excused in circumstances in
which there was a greater than negligible risk of insolvency.
Based on this logic, it is difficult to see how anything that is
properly classified as equity for purposes of bank regulatory
128. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (addressing a bank’s ability to
deduct interest expense on debt for tax purposes).
129. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 119, at 649 (“[O]nce a bank has raised capital
by issuing stock, the stockholders expect a return on their investment. Banks can
increase the expected return on equity by holding more liabilities relative to their
capital[—]that is, by increasing their leverage.”).
130. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the main aim of
bank capital requirements).
131. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 119, at 651 (describing what constitutes “tier
one capital”).
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requirements could constitute debt for purposes of tax law. In tax
law, a number of courts echo some variation of the refrain that an
instrument is debt only if the parties intend for the holder of the
instrument to have a definite right to be repaid a fixed amount at
a certain time, regardless of the income of the obligor.132 As just
discussed, something should only be equity for purposes of capital
requirements if its holder has no definite right to payment. Thus,
the determination that something is equity for purposes of capital
requirements would seem to be in direct conflict with the
conclusion that it is debt for tax purposes.
As a practical matter, an instrument properly classified as
equity for purposes of capital requirements might be classified as
debt for tax purposes because courts (or the IRS) lose sight of the
forest for the trees. The ultimate determination in tax law,
according to a number of courts, turns on whether or not the
parties intend for the holder of an instrument to have a definite
right to payment.133 To determine whether the parties’ possess the
requisite intent, courts engage in an examination of a long list of
objective factors.134 These factors can include, among others,
whether the issuer is thinly capitalized, the liquidity of the issuer’s
assets, the stability of the issuer’s revenues, the terms of the
instrument (such as the length of the term to maturity), and
subordination of the instrument to other creditors.135 In some
cases, courts might allow the examination of factors to supplant
the ultimate determination, or the IRS might do the same when it
issues administrative guidance regarding the tax classification of
certain instruments.136 Thus, for instance, assume a bank issues
132. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (describing use of this
definition of “debt” for tax purposes).
133. Supra note 96 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (listing eight factors as among
those that can be considered).
135. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing factors considered
by courts).
136. In many cases, the IRS will be the source of guidance. For example, in a
2009 Chief Counsel Advisory, the IRS determined that it should not challenge the
taxpayer’s characterization of trust preferred securities as debt for tax purposes.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200932049, at 15 (Aug. 7, 2009)
[hereinafter I.R.S. CCA Mem.]. As mentioned above, at the time, trust preferred
securities were treated as “tier one capital” for certain banks. See supra note 39
and accompanying text. In this CCA, the IRS did not treat the holder’s definite
right to payment as the ultimate question. See I.R.S. CCA Mem., supra note 136,
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an instrument that decidedly does not grant the holder a definite
legal right to payment (so that it can be classified as equity for
purposes of capital requirements). Further, assume the bank is not
thinly capitalized, earns a stable stream of revenue, and holds
significant liquid assets. Because these three factors are generally
factors that weigh in favor of classifying an instrument as debt for
tax purposes, a court might classify this instrument as debt,
notwithstanding the fact that the lack of legal right to enforce
payment would seem to undercut the conclusion that the parties
intend for the holder to have a definite right to payment. Likewise,
if an instrument is properly characterized as debt for tax purposes,
bank regulators might, nevertheless, classify it as equity if they
decide to exercise more leniency and accept some risk that the
holders of the instrument could enforce payment, leading to
insolvency.
To demonstrate, imagine that a bank issues a preferred stock
instrument and that the bank is required to redeem the
instrument at some point in time, but not for a number of years.
Furthermore, assume that the obligation to redeem the instrument
would be excused in circumstances in which the bank faced
financial difficulty. Based on an examination of various facts (such
as the bank’s operating history and the fact that the bank is not
thinly capitalized), facing the type of financial difficulty that would
excuse payment is unlikely. Under this mix of facts, bank
regulators might determine that the instrument is equity because
the holder’s “right” to repayment does not kick in until the distant
future and is sufficiently watered down by conditions under which
the payment is excused. At the same time, based on other facts,
the likelihood that payment will in fact occur is high, despite the
fact that the holder does not have a definite legal right to payment.
Under these facts, the IRS or the courts might determine that the
instrument is debt for tax purposes if they focus on the likelihood
that payment will occur, rather than focusing on the holder’s right
to payment.137 Arguably, this method of analysis is mistaken. As
at 10. Rather, the IRS framed the analysis as a multi-factor analysis in which the
question: “Is there an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain on demand or
at a fixed maturity date that is in the reasonably foreseeable future?” was but one
of a number of factors. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
137. The Chief Counsel Advisory in which the IRS decided to not challenge a
taxpayer’s characterization of trust preferred securities as debt for tax purposes
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described above, the riskiness of an instrument could make a
definite obligation to pay illusory and without substance (so that a
risky instrument should be treated as equity even if the holder has
a formal legal right to payment).138 On the other hand, if the terms
of an instrument explicitly provide that the holder lacks a fully
enforceable right to payment, then the fact that payment is likely
should not affect a court’s analysis of whether the parties intend
for the holder to have a definite right to payment.
Thus, the inconsistency of instruments that are classified as
equity for purposes of bank capital requirements, but as debt for
tax purposes, ought to raise suspicion. In some cases, it might be a
signal to the IRS and to courts to reconsider the instrument’s
provides a useful illustration. See I.R.S. CCA Mem., supra note 136, at 16. In the
CCA, the IRS stated:
The fact that the holders of the Preferred Securities have creditor
rights of practical significance is probative of debt. However, the
Preferred Securities are subject to several conditions which, if
implemented, would cause the periodic payments to be more analogous
to traditional preferred stock dividends than to traditional interest on
long term debt. These include the right of the Taxpayer voluntarily to
defer payments for prolonged periods, limitations on the sources from
which deferred payments can be satisfied, and the potential loss of a
portion of deferred payments in the event of bankruptcy.
Id.
In other words, the “rights” of the holders to enforce payment are fairly weak,
especially in case of financial difficulty, as they likely must be for the instrument
to be treated as equity for bank regulatory purposes. In the CCA, the IRS
continues by stating:
The likelihood of these conditions being implemented, however,
appears to be remote. Taxpayer has an extensive, consistent history of
dividend payments on its common stock which it will have a
substantial economic incentive to maintain and which would be
prohibited if payments were deferred on the Preferred Securities.
Taxpayer indicated that it did not intend to defer payments, and has
sufficient capitalization, liquidity and long term business prospects to
justify the assumption that it will be able to comply with that intention.
Id.
Thus, the IRS switched gears from considering the rights of the holders to receive
payment to analyzing the likelihood that payment will occur. Based on the high
likelihood that payment will occur, the IRS determined that it should not
challenge the characterization of the instruments as debt for tax purposes. Id.
138. See supra Part IV.A (“[I]f the relevant factors suggest that an instrument
is very risky, that determination could undercut a determination that the holder
possessed a formal legal right to payment, so that the instrument would be
treated as equity for tax purposes.”).
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classification for tax purposes.139 In other cases, it might be an
indication that the instrument is not, in fact, serving the goals of
bank regulators.140
D. Summary
Although inconsistent treatment across regulatory regimes is
not always problematic, it sometimes occurs because one or more
of the regulatory regimes suffers from some shortcoming.141 Even
in such a case, the inconsistency is not the problem—rather, one
or more of the regulators has improperly applied the relevant law
or has applied law that does not properly serve the purposes of a
given regime.142 Thus, one of the useful implications of the
139. One might object to tying tax classification more closely to bank
regulatory classification on efficiency grounds. In particular, one might argue
that it will induce banks to issue more instruments that give the holders a definite
right to payment so that the instrument would be debt for purposes of both
regimes. This shift could have the detrimental effect of increasing the risk of
insolvency. In response, two observations could be made. First, this shift could
only occur in the case of banks that currently have issued more equity than the
minimum required by bank regulators. Second, if the shift would increase
insolvency risk beyond an acceptable level, then the solution is in the hands of
bank regulators—they ought to increase the amount of required capital. See supra
notes 119–125 and accompanying text (discussing how increased capital reduces
the risk of insolvency). Of course, if they would not do so because of political
pressure from regulated parties, then tying the regimes more closely together
could have adverse effects. See Schizer, supra note 39, at 1338
[I]t is undesirable for the tax law to create political pressure to repeal
a helpful friction. For instance, assume that a regulated financial
institution cannot claim a tax deduction without triggering adverse
regulatory treatment, as when accounting losses require regulators to
take over the institution. If this tough regulatory treatment ensures
the solvency of regulated institutions, it would be undesirable for
regulators to weaken their standards solely to make the tax deduction
easier to claim.
140. Indeed, the classification of trust preferred securities as “tier one capital”
for certain banks was phased out by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. See Baltali & Tanega, supra note 39, at 43 (“Given
Dodd-Frank Act’s § 171, neither trust preferred securities nor cumulative
perpetual preferred stock would qualify for inclusion as tier 1 capital among the
top 50 [bank holding companies].”).
141. See Barry, supra note 8, at 75 (discussing how inconsistent treatment is
not always a problem, but may be caused by inappropriate treatment by one
regime).
142. See id.
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conclusion reached by this Article is that, at the end of day,
coordination across regulatory regimes may be unnecessary. If
each regulator appropriately applies properly designed law, then
any resulting inconsistency is acceptable. However, in some cases,
inconsistency could serve as a useful flag, alerting a regulator to
an inappropriate classification under a given regime.143 In such
cases, coordination among regulators would be required for
regulators to learn about inconsistent treatment and the relevant
classification rules of other regulatory regimes, but many obstacles
could prevent effective coordination.144 To facilitate awareness of
inconsistent treatment, lawmakers could require regulated parties
to file notices with relevant regulators highlighting inconsistent
treatment.145 For instance, lawmakers could require that any
taxpayer subject to capitalization requirements must file a
disclosure with the IRS if any financial instrument that it issues
is classified differently for capitalization requirements purposes
than for tax purposes. Alternatively, regulators could share more
general information directly with other regulators. For instance,
bank regulators could provide the IRS aggregate data regarding
the characteristics of instruments that are treated as “tier one
capital” so that the IRS could consider whether those
characteristics could be consistent with the tax classification of
debt.

To the extent that there is a problem, it is that one or more of these
regimes treats the securities inappropriately. If the securities really
represent an equity interest within the policy goals of the tax law, then
the tax law is inappropriately treating the securities as debt; if the
securities really represent debt within the policy goals of the banking
regulations, then the banking regulations are incorrectly treating them
as equity.
143. See id. (“The difference in treatment between regimes is an indicator that
one of the regulatory regimes may be treating them inappropriately, but the
difference in treatment is not a problem in and of itself.”).
144. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1335–36 (discussing of some of the
obstacles to effective coordination).
145. Taxpayers are required to disclose to the IRS inconsistency between tax
and accounting treatment in some cases. See News Release, I.R.S., Treasury and
IRS Issue Revised Tax Form for Corporate Tax Returns (July, 7, 2004).
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V. Inconsistency Nullifies a Friction

By claiming inconsistent treatment, a sophisticated party can
obtain a favorable tax outcome without sacrificing his or her
non-tax regulatory goals. Thus, the ability to claim inconsistent
treatment nullifies what could otherwise be a potent friction
against tax planning. In particular, if the taxpayer could not claim
inconsistent treatment, the taxpayer might abandon certain tax
planning if it would result in significantly less advantageous
non-tax regulatory treatment. Given the ability to claim
inconsistent treatment, the planning can proceed undeterred.
In some cases, moreover, a taxpayer’s efforts to obtain
favorable non-tax regulatory treatment actually facilitate, rather
than impede, tax planning. For instance, as discussed above, a
taxpayer who selected a transactional form in order to obtain
non-tax regulatory benefits will be more likely to succeed in
disavowing that form in order to obtain a more favorable tax
outcome than a taxpayer whose form did not produce non-tax
benefits.146
A. Frictions Against Tax Planning
Others have noted that taxpayers’ aims to achieve favorable
results under non-tax regulatory regimes can sometimes serve as
“frictions” against tax planning.147 “Frictions” against tax planning
146. See supra Part II.C (discussing circumstances in which obtaining
benefits under a non-tax regulatory regime can increase the odds of a taxpayer
successfully disavowing his or her selected form to obtain a more favorable tax
outcome). Another example would be the way in which attaining a favorable
non-tax regulatory outcome can serve the role of demonstrating “business
purpose” under the economic substance doctrine. See Lederman, Economic
Substance, supra note 52, at 433 (“[N]on-tax regulatory requirements seem to
provide a business purpose . . . .”).
147. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and
International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1253–54 (2008)
As is well known to any tax adviser, corporate goals in one regime often
run counter to the goals under another. Specifically, for financial
accounting purposes corporations would typically prefer to report
higher income, whereas for tax purposes corporations would typically
prefer to report lower income. This can create an important “friction”
with respect to tax planning. That is, to the extent that aggressive tax
planning reduces income for tax and corporate purposes, the firm may
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are non-tax costs that a taxpayer must bear in order to obtain a
more favorable tax outcome.148 Because of such frictions, taxpayers
will sometimes abandon attempts to structure their transactions
to avoid adverse tax treatment if such structuring would result in
undesirable accounting treatment, adverse non-tax regulatory
treatment, or a sub-optimal business outcome.149
Frictions can be a useful supplement to the tax law.150 Without
frictions, a taxpayer might alter his or her behavior or transactions
just enough to avoid an adverse tax outcome under a given statute
or regulation so that the statute or regulation fails to collect the
intended tax revenue and serves only to encourage taxpayers to
engage in planning.151 Given the presence of frictions, taxpayers
opt not to engage in the tax planning in the first place.
Schizer, supra note 39, at 1328–34 (describing how legal and accounting
constraints can act as “frictions” against tax planning). Some tax planning is
friction-less. Field, supra note 93, at 31. In particular, a taxpayer can sometimes
obtain a more favorable tax outcome merely by filing an election and not altering
his or her behavior or transactions in any costly way. See id. (“[W]ith an explicit
election (as opposed to an implicit election), taxpayers need not alter their non-tax
economic arrangements in order to obtain favorable tax treatment. That is,
explicit elections generally lack ‘frictions’ that impede the use of the election for
tax minimization purposes.”).
148. See, e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS
STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 7 (1992) (“By frictions we mean transaction
costs incurred in the marketplace that make implementation of certain
tax-planning strategies costly.”). Frictions could discourage not just tax planning,
but also tax avoidance. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The
Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 699 (2007)
[T]he tax law often fails to extend the favorable tax treatment afforded
particular reimbursed expenses or losses to similar but unreimbursed
items. This distinction . . . reflects the enforcement benefits that a
reimbursement provides—including the presence of a third party who
implicitly has “vouched” for the bona fides of the taxpayer’s
claim . . . . Although third parties can thus provide a type of “friction”
that reduces tax avoidance, they do not do so in all contexts.
149. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1323 (“Even if a narrow rule does not
cover a particular avoidance strategy, taxpayers will not use this “out” if key
business and legal objectives cannot be satisfied.”); Deborah H. Schenk, An
Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503,
508–13 (2004) (discussing the effects of friction on tax planning).
150. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1323 (“Even if a narrow rule does not
cover a particular avoidance strategy, taxpayers will not use this ‘out’ if key
business and legal objectives cannot be satisfied.”).
151. See, e.g., id. at 1320 (“[H]alfhearted efforts [to prevent tax planning] may
merely add to the cost of planning without deterring anyone, thereby increasing
social waste without collecting more revenue.”).
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will not, in some cases at least, undertake the tax planning
required to avoid an adverse tax outcome because the planning
would impose non-tax costs that exceed the tax benefits.152 The
non-tax costs result from frictions, which could take the form of
less favorable non-tax regulatory outcomes, less favorable
accounting treatment, or sub-optimal business outcomes, for
instance.153
The ability of sophisticated parties to simultaneously obtain
favorable treatment under multiple regulatory regimes can nullify
the effects of otherwise potent frictions against tax planning.154
Dean Schizer uses the term “malleable” to describe a friction that
can be avoided by characterizing a transaction for tax purposes in
a manner that differs from its accounting or other non-tax
treatment.155
Thus, one objection to the ability to obtain inconsistent
treatment is that, by facilitating tax planning, inconsistent
treatment exacerbates many of the negative ramifications of tax
planning.156 As mentioned above, tax planning is problematic for
three reasons, at least when it is not the type of planning that tax
law is designed to encourage.157 First, it reduces tax revenue.158
Second, it perpetuates unfairness as well as the perception that

152. See, e.g., id. at 1323–26 (describing, in general terms, when frictions will
prevent tax planning).
153. See id. at 1326–34 (discussing potential frictions including the effects of
planning on business outcome, non-tax regulatory treatment, and accounting
treatment).
154. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing how inconsistent
treatment can make it so that non-tax regulatory regimes no longer act as an
effective friction against tax planning).
155. See Schizer, supra note 39, at 1324 (“Can the deal be tweaked so the
expense no longer depresses accounting earnings, but still generates a tax
deduction? If so, the accounting friction is malleable and will not stop the tax
planning.”).
156. See id. (pointing out that malleable frictions do not stop tax planning).
157. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (mentioning the potential
negative consequences of tax planning).
158. See id. (stating that tax revenue is lost when parties seek out beneficial
tax outcomes).
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the tax system is unfair.159 Third, it potentially undermines
efficiency.160
However, as others have noted, limitations on tax planning do
not necessarily further efficiency.161 Sometimes limitations on tax
planning further efficiency by prompting taxpayers to select
transactions for non-tax reasons alone.162 However, sometimes
limitations that foreclose certain tax planning strategies simply

159. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (mentioning the effects of
tax planning on fairness and perceptions of fairness).
160. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
effects of tax planning on efficiency).
161. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and
Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1356 (2000)
Ultimately, the effect of any reform on the planning option turns on
empirical questions. Some taxpayers will be stopped from
planning . . . . This is a good result because extra revenue is collected
without distorting taxpayer behavior. On the other hand, some
taxpayers will change their transactions to avoid the reform . . . . In
these cases, revenue does not increase[,] . . . while the tax rules do
distort taxpayer behavior. The relative magnitude of these effects
determines the reform’s overall impact on planning-related waste.
Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 93, at 1669–70
[W]e cannot simply interpret the models as suggesting that lines in the
tax law should be made harder to avoid. A line can be too hard to avoid,
at least from an efficiency perspective. This can happen because there
are two components in the deadweight loss triangles (or marginal
deadweight loss trapezoids): the width (reflecting elasticity) and the
height (reflecting the size of the tax). Taxing a low-elasticity item too
high is not optimal. We can think of these dimensions as the number
of taxpayers that shift their behavior (the width) and the social cost
(loss of consumer surplus) for each shift (the height). If a line is too
hard to avoid, there may be few shifts, but each shift will have a large
cost. Making the line easier to avoid effectively reduces the tax on an
activity because it is cheaper to avoid the tax. This may reduce
deadweight loss even though additional taxpayers will alter their
behavior.
See generally Philip A. Curry et al., Creating Failures in the Market for Tax
Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 943 (2007) (discussing how policymakers face a
trade-off when considering measures to attack current tax planning strategies,
namely, the trade-off between (i) costs arising from taxpayers’ use of those current
tax planning strategies and (ii) costs arising from taxpayers’ search for new tax
planning strategies once the existing methods are attacked).
162. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency
effects of tax planning limitations).
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cause taxpayers to shift to other, potentially even more wasteful
tax planning strategies.163
To demonstrate, assume that by engaging in one transaction
(Transaction A), a taxpayer would earn, over one year, a 14%
pre-tax return, but a 12% after-tax return. By contrast, by
engaging in a different transaction (Transaction B) over the same
time period, the taxpayer would earn a 15% pre-tax return, but a
10% after-tax return. If the taxpayer engages in tax planning, he
or she will consider tax consequences when evaluating the
transactions and will likely opt for Transaction A because it
maximizes the taxpayer’s private wealth. From a societal
standpoint, however, the choice to engage in Transaction A is
wasteful. Investing $100 in Transaction A for one year yields a
total of $114 instead of the $115 total from Transaction B. If the
taxpayer engaged in Transaction A, he or she will pay only $2 in
tax for a net profit of $12. When the taxpayer engages in
Transaction B, he or she will pay $5 in tax for a net profit of $10.
Therefore, although Transaction A generates more individual
wealth, the total profit from Transaction A is $1 less than the total
profit from Transaction B. These results are summarized in Table
1 below.
Table 1. Numerical Example of Effects of Tax Planning
TRANSACTION A

TRANSACTION B

Pre-Tax Return

14%

15%

Effective Tax Rate

14.29%

33.33%

After-Tax Return

12%

10%

$100 INVESTED FOR ONE YEAR:
Total Profit

163.

$14

Supra note 161 and accompanying text.

$15
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Tax Paid

$2

$5

Profit Retained by
Taxpayer

$12

$10
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If certain limitations on tax planning make it so that the
after-tax return earned by the taxpayer from Transaction A is
lower than the after-tax return earned from Transaction B, then,
in some cases, the taxpayer will opt for Transaction B. In those
cases, limitations on tax planning will further the goal of efficiency.
In other cases, limiting certain tax planning strategies could
encourage taxpayers to refocus their efforts on even more wasteful
strategies. For example, limitations that lower the after-tax return
of Transaction A, in the above example, will not improve overall
efficiency if other available, comparable transactions continue to
yield lower pre-tax returns, but higher after-tax returns than
Transactions A and B.164

164. To demonstrate this, Table 2 shows Table 1 modified to include a third
possible transaction, Transaction C. If the results of three transactions were as
shown in Table 2, the taxpayer would select Transaction A because it would
generate the highest after-tax return. From a societal standpoint, this choice
would not be optimal because Transaction A would generate a lower pre-tax
return than Transaction B, but Transaction A would be preferable to Transaction
C from a societal standpoint.
TABLE 2.

Pre-Tax Return
Effective
Rate
After-Tax
Return

Tax

TRANSACTION A

TRANSACTION B

TRANSACTION C

14%

15%

13%

14.29%

33.33%

20%

12%

10%

10.40%

$100 INVESTED FOR ONE YEAR:
Total Profit

$14

$15

$13

Tax Paid

$2

$5

$2.60
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What is generally true of limitations on tax planning—that
they sometimes further efficiency, but sometimes subvert it—is
also true of frictions against tax planning.165 For instance, a
Profit Retained

$12

$10

$10.40

by Taxpayer
Thus, if limitations on tax planning were to reduce the after-tax return of
Transaction A so that it would be lower than the after-tax return earned from
Transaction B, but if those limitations did not affect the after-tax return earned
from Transaction C, then taxpayers could opt for Transaction C, which would be
even more wasteful from a societal standpoint.
165. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 276 (“The same frictions touted as
beneficial in deterring wasteful planning manifest as increased transaction costs
when the planning takes place nonetheless.”); Kane & Rock, supra note 147, at
1254
Whether this type of friction results in social value or social cost in the
aggregate is ambiguous. Frictions can create value where they operate
to bolster narrow tax provisions in curtailing wasteful tax avoidance
behavior. But frictions can also create social costs. With respect to some
taxpayers, for example, frictions may simply raise the cost of socially
wasteful behavior rather than deterring it.
Schizer, supra note 39 at 1338
Problems can arise not only if the friction has adverse nontax effects,
but also if it serves a useful nontax function. It would be undesirable
for the tax law to undermine a useful friction. For instance, assume the
relevant friction is the taxpayer’s desire for public trading. Various
governmental efforts support public trading, such as the SEC’s
registration of public securities and monitoring of trading practices.
These public investments are often defended because of positive
externalities, or the benefits that liquid markets provide to third
parties. For instance, more accurate pricing of assets provides valuable
guidance even for people who are not currently trading. What if the tax
burden on publicly traded securities is raised? Ideally, the nontax
benefits of trading would always outweigh the tax savings, so no one
would stop trading in these markets. But, in contrast, if the tax savings
outweigh these nontax benefits, causing taxpayers to stop trading,
taxpayers and third parties would no longer enjoy the benefits of these
transactions.
Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L.
REV. 643, 658–59 (1995) (“[T]he use of such friction may be good or bad, depending
on the ratio between deterring undesirable tax-motivated transactions on the one
hand, and causing people to bear excess burden rather than pay tax on the
other.”); Daniel Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the
Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 223 (2000) [hereinafter Shaviro, Economic
Substance]
Evidently, then, the rationale for an economic substance approach is
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stronger linkage of tax classification to corporate law classification
might prevent wasteful tax planning by some taxpayers. In
particular, some would be unwilling to sacrifice a business form
that was optimal for corporate law purposes in order to obtain a
more favorable tax outcome. However, some taxpayers would
sacrifice the optimal corporate law outcome in order to obtain a
more favorable tax outcome, undermining efficiency in those
cases.166 For this reason, the desire to maintain a friction against
tax planning might not justify requiring consistent treatment
across regulatory regimes.
B. Other Regulatory Regimes and Purpose
As discussed above, others have argued that the goal of
efficiency might be undermined by requiring consistent treatment
across regulatory regimes because the resulting friction will not
stop all tax planning, and may raise the costs of the tax planning
that continues.167 Aside from its potential to undermine efficiency,
that it may generate frictional impediments to certain socially
undesirable tax planning . . . . It should be clear, therefore, that the
desirability of an economic substance approach depends on two main
things. The first is the social desirability of deterring optimal tax
planning in the cases that are being addressed. The second is the
extent to which it succeeds in generating such deterrence rather than
simply inducing taxpayers to jump through a few extra hoops before
getting the desired tax consequences anyway.
166. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 1, at 278–79
Decoupling tax and corporate law again holds promise. In the case of
unincorporated entities, the tax regulations have already partially
decoupled tax from corporate law. Prior to 1996, the tax classification
of an unincorporated entity turned on a multifactor test that included
such corporate law attributes as limited liability, centralized
management, unlimited life, and free transferability of interest. Under
the check-the-box regulations, most unincorporated entities may now
elect whether to be treated as a partnership or a corporation for tax
purposes. We still have a corporate tax; its boundaries are now
effectively enforced by the publicly traded partnership rules rather
than corporate law attributes. By making the tax classification of
unincorporated entities elective, tax no longer distorts an
entrepreneur’s decision whether to organize as a limited partnership,
an LLC, or whatever new entity comes next.
167. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text (describing how some
frictions will not stop all tax planning but will merely increase its costs).
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use of another regulatory regime as the source of friction might not
be ideal because it could lead to arbitrary outcomes when the other
regulatory regime classifies transactions in a manner that is
unrelated to the goals of tax law. In order to illustrate, consider
the example of state usury laws. If we wanted to transform state
usury laws into a friction that was not “malleable”—to use Dean
Schizer’s term168—we would modify tax doctrine to provide that an
instrument cannot be classified as debt for tax purposes unless it
would be classified as debt for tax purposes under existing doctrine
and also is classified as debt for state usury law purposes. State
usury laws, however, might classify an instrument as debt or
equity based on form (i.e., the labels assigned by the parties) or
based on substantive factors that might have little to do with the
goals of tax law.169
To illustrate, assume that a state classifies instruments as
debt or equity for usury law purposes based on the label assigned
by the parties. Consider a taxpayer who contemplates issuing an
instrument that would be treated as debt for tax purposes in order
to obtain an interest deduction. But for the tax benefit obtained
from the interest deduction, the taxpayer would not issue this
instrument. Further, assume that if the taxpayer were only
considering existing tax law (i.e., prior to the adoption of the usury
law friction) and business factors, the taxpayer would issue an
instrument that would yield X%. Assume, if the instrument were
debt for state usury law purposes, X% would exceed the maximum
allowable rate. Now, assume the state usury law “friction” were
adopted so that an instrument cannot be classified as debt for tax
purposes unless it would be classified as debt for tax purposes
under existing doctrine and also were classified as debt for state
usury law purposes.
Given this change to tax law, the taxpayer could choose among
three options:
Option 1. The taxpayer could refrain from issuing the
instrument entirely.

168. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (citing Dean Schizer’s use of
the term “malleable” to describe frictions easily avoided by obtaining inconsistent
treatment across regimes).
169. See supra Part IV.B (addressing debt and equity determinations in state
usury law).
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Option 2. The taxpayer could label the instrument “debt” so
that it was debt for state usury law purposes and tax purposes. The
taxpayer must, then, reduce the yield on the instrument to comply
with state usury law. Furthermore, to make the reduced yield
palatable to the holder of the instrument, the taxpayer must
modify the terms in other ways, perhaps by providing security for
the loan, for instance.
Option 3. The taxpayer could label the instrument “equity”
and retain the yield that the taxpayer originally contemplated as
well as the other terms of the instrument. Under this option,
however, the instrument would be treated as equity for state usury
law purposes and, therefore, also treated as equity for tax
purposes. Thus, the taxpayer would not be entitled to an interest
deduction.
In this example, the taxpayer would not select Option 3
because the facts of this hypothetical assumed that the taxpayer’s
only reason for issuing the instrument was to obtain an interest
deduction for tax purposes. If the taxpayer were to select Option 1,
then the state usury laws would have fulfilled their “friction”
role—they would have prevented a taxpayer from engaging in a
tax-motivated transaction. If the taxpayer were to select Option 2,
then the taxpayer would have persisted in engaging in a
tax-motivated transaction. The result might be more or less
efficient than what the taxpayer had originally planned to do,
depending on whether the modifications to the terms of the
instrument bring the result nearer to or farther from an efficient
outcome.
The observations made so far demonstrate the argument that
others have made regarding the possibility that frictions could, in
some cases, further efficiency, but in others, undermine it.170 Aside
from considering efficiency, I would argue it is worthwhile to
assess whether we have served the purposes of tax doctrine. If the
instrument that the taxpayer originally planned to issue would
have been substantively debt without the modifications that the
taxpayer must now make to it, then requiring that this taxpayer
make these modifications in order to obtain debt classification
arguably does not serve the goals of tax law. This is particularly
170. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text (mentioning the
potential for positive and negative effects on efficiency resulting from frictions).
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true when we take into account the fact that not all taxpayers will
be subject to state usury laws.171 Therefore, only some taxpayers
would be required to comply with state usury laws in order to
obtain an interest deduction for tax purposes.172 Thus, the need to
modify the terms of instruments would fall arbitrarily on only
some taxpayers.173
To further illustrate the point, consider an example involving
a friction that is not a non-tax regulatory regime—the rules that
govern the tax treatment of alimony. By default, alimony
payments are included in the income of the spouse receiving
alimony174 and deducted by the spouse paying alimony.175
However, when both spouses agree, the recipient may exclude the
payments from income, and the payor does not deduct the
payments.176 This tax treatment provides the individuals with a
valuable tax planning opportunity, at least when the former
spouses are subject to different effective tax rates.177
171. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (giving the example that
usury laws may not apply to loans made to “sophisticated” borrowers).
172. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (stating that some taxpayers
are exempt from usury laws).
173. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1337
Rules that depend on frictions can redistribute tax burdens in random
or undesirable ways. The problem is that some taxpayers may be
uniquely able to avoid the friction. For instance, if securities dealers
cannot supply a particular avoidance transaction, but insurance
companies can, a reform may transfer wealth from dealers to insurers.
Likewise, if a tax benefit is conditioned on adverse accounting, the
benefit may be claimed only by firms that are relatively unconcerned
about this regime. Since indifference to the friction has little to do with
ability to pay, normatively comparable firms will be taxed differently.
174. See I.R.C. § 71(a) (2012) (“Gross income includes amounts received as
alimony.”).
175. See id. § 215(a) (“[T]here shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal
to the alimony . . . paid during such individuals taxable year.”).
176. See id. § 71(b)(1)(B) (defining alimony as a payment that “the divorce or
separation instrument does not designate . . . as a payment which is not included
in gross income”).
177. The default rule would be advantageous if the spouse paying alimony
were in a higher tax bracket than the spouse receiving alimony. In order to
demonstrate, assume the payor is subject to a 35% tax rate, the recipient is
subject to a 25% tax rate, and the amount of alimony paid is $50,000. By
deducting alimony, the payor would incur tax liability that was $17,500 lower
than the liability he or she would have incurred absent the deduction. At the same
time, by including the payment in income, the recipient would become subject to
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Furthermore, in part because of the tax treatment of alimony,
a divorced couple could pay less in total tax liability than the
couple would have paid while married. Imagine, for instance, that
A and B were married. A earned $300,000 per year and B earned
$0. As a married couple filing a joint return, ignoring the effects of
any deductions, they would be subject to total liability of $74,413
in 2016.178 Assume they divorce and assume A pays B $150,000 of
alimony per year and the parties opt for the default treatment for
alimony (deductible by A and included in B’s income). As a result,
each would be a single taxpayer who earned $150,000 of taxable
income per year, ignoring any deductions other than the alimony
deduction. As such, each would be subject to total tax liability of
$35,036.75 in 2016.179 As a result, together, they would be subject
tax liability that was $12,500 higher than the liability to which he or she would
have been subject without this income. Thus, the aggregate tax liability of the
parties under the default rule would be $5,000 lower than the aggregate tax
liability that would have resulted had the parties elected out of the default rule.
Moreover, both spouses could share in this aggregate benefit if the spouse paying
alimony increased the amount paid in order to shift some of the benefit of the tax
deduction to the spouse receiving alimony. For example, assume the paying
spouse was subject to a 35% tax rate, the receiving spouse was subject to a 25%
tax rate, and the parties would have agreed to alimony payments of $50,000 if
they opted out of the default treatment. Retaining the default treatment and
increasing the amount of the payment to $70,000 would improve the economic
position of both individuals. If the payment was $50,000 and the parties opted out
of the default treatment, the paying spouse would incur a $50,000 after-tax loss
(he or she would pay $50,000 and would not be entitled to a deduction). The
receiving spouse would achieve a $50,000 after-tax gain (he or she would receive
$50,000 and would not be subject to tax on the payment). If the payment were
increased to $70,000 and the parties did not opt out of default treatment, the
paying spouse would incur a $45,500 after-tax loss ($70,000 pre-tax payment
minus $24,500 tax savings resulting from deducting the payment from income
taxed at 35%). Thus, the paying spouse’s economic position would be improved by
$4,500. The receiving spouse would achieve a $52,500 after-tax gain ($70,000
payment minus $17,500 tax liability incurred as a result of taxing the payment
at 25%). Thus, the receiving spouse’s economic position would improve by $2,500.
For simplicity, all of the preceding calculations assume that including the
payment in income (or deducting the payment) would not be sufficient to move
the paying spouse or receiving spouse into a different marginal tax bracket.
178. For simplicity, this calculation ignores the effects of any available
deductions. This amount is calculated as follows: 10% times $18,550 + 15% times
($75,300 – $18,550) + 25% times ($151,900 – $75,300) + 28% times
($231,450 – $151,900) + 33% times ($300,000 – $231,450).
179. For simplicity, this calculation ignores the effects of any available
deductions. This amount is calculated as follows: 10% times $9,275 + 15% times
($37,650 – $9,275) + 25% times ($91,150 – $37,650) + 28% times
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to tax liability of $70,073.50, which is $4,339.50 lower than the tax
liability they would have owed as a married couple.180
For that reason, parties might engage in tax-motivated
“friendly divorces” in order to obtain the tax benefit resulting from
the tax treatment of alimony. To guard against this possibility, the
Internal Revenue Code provides that a payment made to an
ex-spouse cannot be alimony if the ex-spouses are members of the
same household.181 Thus, to prevent tax-motivated, friendly
divorces, the tax law adopts a “friction”—and likely a powerful
friction. Namely, the parties cannot attain their tax objective
unless they live in different homes.182
In this case, the limitation is not merely a friction, but also
arguably serves the underlying goals of tax law. If the ex-spouses
do live in different homes, they more closely resemble a typical
divorced couple in a way that is relevant to tax law. In particular,
the maintenance of separate homes is consistent with treating the
alimony payment as an expense of one spouse (given that the
payment funds a household of which he or she is not a part) and
income earned by the other spouse.
To further demonstrate the point, one could imagine a
hypothetical alternative to the current rule. In particular, imagine
that the Internal Revenue Code were to provide that if ex-spouses
are members of the same household, a payment can be alimony
only if the spouses refrain from watching television for the entire
year. This restriction could also serve as a friction against
tax-motivated, friendly divorces.
Under either current law or the hypothetical alternative, some
couples might engage in friendly divorces notwithstanding the
($150,000 – $91,150).
180. This is also less than the tax liability they would owe if they were never
married. In that case, A, as a single taxpayer with taxable income of $300,000
would owe tax liability of $82,529,25. This amount is calculated as follows:
10% times $9,275 + 15% times ($37,650 – $9,275) + 25% times
($91,150 – $37,650) + 28% times ($190,150 – $91,150) + 33% times
($300,000 – $190,150). B, as a single taxpayer with $0 taxable income would owe
$0 in tax liability. Thus, their total tax liability would be $82,529. For simplicity,
these calculations ignore the effects of any deductions.
181. See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C) (2012) (requiring that the payee spouse and the
payor spouse are not members of the same household at the time of the alimony
payment).
182. Id.
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friction.183 Under current law, however, if the couple does proceed
with the divorce, they will resemble the typical divorced couple in
a way that might justify the tax treatment of alimony.184 In the
case of the hypothetical alternative, the couple does not resemble
the typical divorced couple in any relevant way. Therefore, they
obtain tax treatment that is essentially arbitrary.
In summary, the ability to obtain inconsistent treatment
across regulatory regimes neutralizes a potential friction and
potentially facilitates tax planning. However, that result might be
a lesser evil than the alternative of making the friction less
avoidable. If the friction were less avoidable, some taxpayers would
still engage in tax planning and bear the costs resulting from the
friction. This potentially contributes to inefficiency. Furthermore,
when the goals of the non-tax regulatory regime are unrelated to
the goals of tax law, using the regime to create a friction produces
arbitrary outcomes that do not serve the underlying purposes of
tax doctrine.
C. Addressing Counter-Arguments
In the preceding Part, I have argued that a non-tax regulatory
regime does not serve well as a friction against tax planning when
the purpose of the regime is not aligned with purpose of the
relevant tax rules, because those who engage in tax planning
despite the friction will be taxed in an arbitrary manner that is
inconsistent with the relevant tax provision’s purpose.185 Two
objections might be raised in response, and each objection is
discussed and addressed below.

183. Imagine a married couple that already needed to maintain separate
homes because each spouse worked in a different part of the country. One could
imagine this couple conceivably engaging in a “friendly divorce” because they
might not view the separate homes requirement as an impediment.
184. See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text (describing the default
tax treatment of alimony as included in gross income by the receiving spouse and
allowable as a deduction by the paying spouse).
185. See supra Part V.B (providing examples of potential arbitrary outcomes
in such circumstances).
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1. The Argument Misses the Point of Frictions

One might object to the consideration of purpose on the
grounds that, conceptually, frictions are merely useful tools to
hinder tax planning, and that frictions need not have anything to
do with tax law or its goals. In other words, one might argue that
the only thing that matters is the end result—planning around tax
rules is discouraged.186
When the friction stops tax planning, this may be true. When
tax planning occurs despite the friction, then we should care about
what the friction requires. Consider, for instance, the hypothetical
alternative friction against friendly divorces described above.187 In
186. See, e.g., Leigh Osofksy, Who’s Naughty and Who’s Nice? Frictions,
Screening, and Tax Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2013)
According to this theory [of frictions against tax planning], tax law
relies on frictions, or nontax costs, in order to make tax planning more
expensive. The goal is to deter these transactions, which are viewed as
socially wasteful. Under this theory, at least with respect to the tax
law, a friction serves no useful role, other than to deter the tax
planning . . . . This focus on the deterrence aspect of frictions has
caused scholars to generally agree upon two pieces of conventional
wisdom regarding frictions. Good frictions should (1) deter tax
planning rather than cause it to continue in a more wasteful fashion,
and (2) not impose costs on regular business transactions.
Professor Osofsky observes that frictions can also serve a screening function. See
id. at 1058 (“I argue that frictions serve a more extensive and complex role than
has been recognized previously. Although not focused on in the tax literature,
frictions function first as screening mechanisms, by tracking underlying
characteristics of taxpayers and imposing different costs on different groups.”);
see also Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (2008) (“Forcing taxpayers to bear risk has no
connection to income measurement or any other fundamental goal of our tax
system. It is just a friction—a cost imposed on taxpayers to prevent them from
escaping tax, primarily on capital income.”); Shaviro, Economic Substance, supra
note 165, at 222
From this perspective, economic substance is just a tool for
accomplishing aims that have little to do with how one might define it
as a matter of internal logic . . . . [O]ne might as well condition
favorable tax consequences on whether the taxpayer’s chief financial
officer can execute 20 back-somersaults in the IRS National Office at
midnight on April Fool’s Day, if such a requirement turns out to
achieve a better ratio of successful deterrence to inducing wasteful
effort in meeting requirements that are pointless in themselves.
187. The hypothetical alternative involved imagining that the Internal
Revenue Code were to provide that if ex-spouses are members of the same
household, a payment can be alimony only if the spouses refrain from watching
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cases in which it prevents taxpayers from engaging in
tax-motivated divorces, the arbitrariness of the rule arguably does
not matter. However, in cases in which the tax-motivated divorces
continue, an arbitrary friction leads to arbitrary outcomes.
2. Purpose is Indeterminate
One might also object to the consideration of purpose based on
the view that purpose is indeterminate and, therefore, cannot
provide a useful guide regarding whether a friction is or is not
desirable. To take the example of the determination of whether an
instrument is debt or equity for tax purposes, treating debt
differently from equity does not serve any clear underlying
purpose.188 Therefore, we cannot judge whether a friction serves or
undercuts the underlying purpose given that there is no such
thing.
To clarify, I am not using the terms “purpose” of tax law or
“goals” of tax law to refer to underlying normative goals. I
acknowledge that what I have labeled “purpose” or “goals” might
be labeled, more accurately, as existing tax law doctrine or
consistent application of precedent. For instance, when judging
whether it is appropriate to treat an instrument as equity for bank
capital requirements, but debt for tax purposes, I have argued
above that this determination depends on whether or not the
holder of the instrument has a definite right to payment so that
the instrument is properly classified as debt for tax purposes.189 I
am not asserting that classifying an instrument differently when
the holder has a definite right to payment furthers a fundamental,
underlying policy of tax law. Rather, I am arguing that the courts
have held that a definite right to payment is the defining
television for the entire year.
188. See, e.g., Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 93, at 1638
As with the realization requirement, one cannot use the underlying
purpose behind the debt-equity distinction to draw the line [between
debt and equity] . . . . Given this lack of normative content for the
corporate tax, it is difficult to determine the appropriate debt-equity
boundary by reference to the underlying goals.
189. See supra Part IV.C (observing that existing tax doctrine provides that
an instrument is debt for tax purposes when the holder has a definite right to
payment).
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characteristic of debt. Therefore, given the tax law that exists,
instruments should be classified in a manner that is consistent
with this doctrine.
One might respond that doctrine can always change.190 That
is certainly true; however, if a change to tax doctrine is desirable,
then for reasons of transparency, it ought to be initiated directly,
rather than indirectly by requiring taxpayers to make changes for
purposes of other regulatory regimes. For example, consider the
illustration above regarding state usury law and tax law.191
Imagine the regimes were linked so that an instrument could only
be classified as debt for tax purposes if the instrument would be
classified as debt under existing tax doctrine and also is classified
as debt for state usury law purposes. Under this new regime, some
taxpayers that were subject to state usury laws might modify the
terms of instruments that would have been debt for tax purposes
without this change.192 In particular, taxpayers might reduce the
yield on the instrument to comply with state usury laws and make
other changes (such as providing security for the loan) to make the
reduced yield palatable to the instrument’s holder. Certainly,
these changes (a reduced yield and additional security) make the
190. Furthermore, in some cases, existing doctrine perhaps should change if
it does not best serve underlying policy goals. See, e.g., Weisbach, Line Drawing,
supra note 93, at 1643–44
The typical approach to line drawing is platonic. It searches for the
essential meaning of words, such as corporation, partnership, debt,
equity, selling, or holding, and draws lines accordingly. For
example, . . . the current doctrine distinguishing debt and equity looks
to the typical features of “debt” and “equity.” The platonic approach
fails as a general method of drawing lines. The platonic or essentialist
notions contained in doctrinal rules are not tied to values that a tax
system should promote. Tax doctrines do not, for example, draw lines
that necessarily make the system more equitable, more efficient, or
more administratively feasible. Moreover, platonic approaches cannot
be defended on pragmatic grounds because the words themselves do
not have readily accessible meanings. The effect is that the platonic
approach does not make the system more certain.
191. See supra Part IV.B (discussing circumstances in which an instrument
could be classified as debt for tax purposes, but equity for state usury law
purposes).
192. See supra Part IV.B (discussing how, under such a regime, taxpayers
who wanted to issue an instrument that was treated as debt for tax purposes
might reduce the yield on the instrument to comply with state usury laws and
make other changes so that the reduced yield was acceptable to the instrument’s
holder).
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instrument more debt-like. However, if courts did not think the
instrument was sufficiently debt-like without the changes to
obtain classification as debt for tax purposes, then they ought to
reach that conclusion directly, holding that an instrument with the
original features was equity for tax purposes. Such an approach
would be more transparent, and it would apply across the board to
all taxpayers and not merely to taxpayers who needed to modify
the terms of an instrument to comply with state usury laws.
VI. Conclusion
Sophisticated parties frequently structure their transactions
to simultaneously obtain beneficial treatment under multiple
regulatory regimes, sometimes by designing a given transaction so
that it is classified differently for purposes of different regimes.193
For example, a bank might issue an instrument treated as debt for
tax purposes, but categorized as equity for purposes of capital
requirements imposed by bank regulators.
Inconsistency across regulatory regimes is not necessarily
problematic.194 Different regulatory regimes can serve different
purposes so that, in some cases, inconsistent treatment across the
regimes is perfectly consistent with the goals of each regime.195
Moreover, when the regimes serve different purposes, requiring
consistent treatment across the regimes could undercut the goals
of one or more of the regimes.196 For instance, requiring that the
tax classification of a given transaction must not differ from its
classification for purposes of some other regime, in order to impose
a friction against tax planning, could undercut the goals of tax law
and result in arbitrary tax outcomes.197

193. See supra Part II.A (presenting examples of inconsistent treatment).
194. See supra Part III (arguing that inconsistency is not necessarily
problematic).
195. See supra Part III (noting that inconsistency may arise from the fact that
different regimes serve different goals).
196. See supra Part III (noting that if different regimes serve different goals,
then it might be necessary to classify a transaction differently for purposes of each
regime to avoid a true inconsistency).
197. See supra Part V.B (providing examples of how requiring consistent
treatment could produce arbitrary results).
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In other cases, however, inconsistency could represent a
byproduct of incorrect classification by one or more of the
regimes.198 Even in such cases, the inconsistency itself is not what
is objectionable.199 Rather, the defect is simply the failure of one
(or more) of the regimes to classify the transaction in a manner
that best serves the goals of that regime.200

198. See supra Part IV (illustrating that inconsistency could be a byproduct
of a failing in one or more regulatory regimes).
199. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (explaining how the problem
in such a case is not inconsistency but is instead a failing by one or more of the
regimes).
200. Id.

